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ARTICLE




A central debate in the field of legislation has asked: how reliable are the
different types of legislative history? Yet there has been no understanding,
throughout this debate, of who inside Congress drafts this legislative history.
This is surprising, given the common intuition that authorship is a key indicator
of reliability.
In response, this Article presents the results of an original empirical
study—one that illuminates this unknown dimension of Congress, uncovering
the actors and processes that produce modern legislative history. For this study,
the author conducted interviews with congressional staffers drawn from both
parties, both chambers of Congress, and numerous committees. Through the
study, the Article discovers that different types of legislative history are drafted
by very different actors within Congress—actors with fundamentally different
competencies, motivations, and job descriptions.
Based on these findings, the Article urges statutory interpreters to adopt a
new hierarchy of legislative history materials. Unlike the prevailing hierarchy,
this new approach allows interpreters to prioritize legislative history drafted by
those in Congress who possess the capacity, and the institutional motivation, to
predictably generate reliable documents.
The interviews conducted for this Article also provided numerous addi-
tional discoveries about the inner workings of the modern Congress. The Article
reports these discoveries, and it examines their implications for ongoing debates
about democracy, legislative process, and statutory interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last forty years, Congress has undergone a fundamental trans-
formation. Today, this legislative body no longer is a quaint institution popu-
lated only by legislators and a small cadre of assistants.1 Instead, it has been
remade into something much larger and more complex.2 This new Congress
1 Congressional staffers did not even exist during the first six decades after the ratification
of the Constitution. See HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL
STAFFS 15 (1977). On the modest increases in staffing from the mid-nineteenth century
through the mid-twentieth century, see id. at 20–43; GLADYS KAMMERER, THE STAFFING OF
THE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS 15–23 (1949).
2 See, e.g., EDWARD M. KENNEDY, TRUE COMPASS 486 (2009) (describing the “shift of
responsibility [from legislators to staffers] over the past forty or fifty years” as “enormous”);
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employs thousands of committee staffers; it retains hundreds of experts in
each of its nonpartisan congressional offices; and it permits each elected
representative to retain formidable legislative and communications depart-
ments.3 Moreover, it has established the many mechanisms of communica-
tion and accountability that are needed to make these thousands of
individuals operate as a single, coherent institution. In short, Congress has
been transformed into something that it did not resemble prior to the 1970s:
a large, modern bureaucratic institution.4
As a result of this transformation, new divisions of labor prevail in the
modern Congress. Over a series of articles, a number of scholars—myself
included—have attempted to outline these new congressional divisions of
labor and explain their significance for statutory interpretation.5 This schol-
arly movement, which Amy Barrett has labeled “the process-based turn in
RONALD KESSLER, INSIDE CONGRESS 80 (1998) (quoting Dan Quayle, describing the increase
as “unbelievable”); Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, U.S. Congressman as Enter-
prise, 6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 559, 559 (1981) (describing the “tremendous growth in the last dec-
ade” of congressional staff).
3 In 2016, Member offices employed 6,880 individuals, and committees employed 1,298
individuals. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43947, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF LEVELS
IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER OFFICES, 1977-2016 10 n.1 (2016), https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160913_R43947_da2c748f8678c287d55f1dc7ef1c843c6f25a
93f.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y63E-WM87] [hereinafter HOUSE STAFF]; R. ERIC PETERSON &
AMBER HOPE WILHELM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43496, SENATE STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER,
COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND OTHER OFFICES, 1977-2016 1 n.1 (2016), https://www.every
crsreport.com/files/20160913_R43946_3db32886cf87195c80f3b0056a6b2c7a0e848f2d.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8N8B-SCDT] [hereinafter SENATE STAFF]. On nonpartisan offices, see Staff
of J. Comm. on Printing, 112th Cong., 2011–2012; Official Cong. Directory, S. Pub. No. 112-
12, at 394–93, 460–61 (2011) (showing that the number of attorneys in the Offices of the
Legislative Counsel tripled between 1975 and 2011); Organization and Staffing, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, https://www.cbo.gov/about/organization-and-staffing [https://perma.cc/
Q7TV-9RHD] (showing that the Congressional Budget Office now employs about 250 policy
experts and economists).
4 On this transformation, see, for example, Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 2, at 559 R
(arguing that Congress had changed to resemble, in its bureaucracy, a modern business
enterprise).
5 See Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 83 (2019); Abbe
R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 90 (2015); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575 (2002); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legisla-
tive Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 822 (2014); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legis-
lation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 120–24 (2015); see generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
JUDGING STATUTES (2014); Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The Congressional Bureaucracy
[forthcoming]; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Congressional Drafting Part I]; Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congres-
sional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) [hereinafter
Congressional Drafting Part II]; Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012).
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statutory interpretation,” has shed new light on the inner workings of this
bureaucratic Congress.6
Until now, this “process-based turn” has focused primarily on a spe-
cific legislative product: statutory text. It has chronicled the actors, interac-
tions, and processes that produce the text of federal statutes.7 This focus on
statutory drafting was a logical starting point for a “process-based turn” in
legislation. Yet it leaves open a number of important questions about the
production of legislative materials beyond statutory text. Most obviously, it
leaves unexamined another legislative product that features centrally in stat-
utory interpretation: the set of documents and statements that, collectively,
courts cite as “legislative history.”8
The need for an updated, process-based understanding of legislative
history is clear. Rather than investigating who actually drafts legislative his-
tory in the modern Congress, judges and scholars have attributed authorship
to a vague category of actor that is labeled, generally, as the “staffer.”9
Meanwhile, an entire debate has occurred over the reliability of different
types of legislative history—and it has occurred without any awareness of
the fact that, in the modern Congress, very different types of “staffer” are
assigned drafting responsibility for different types of legislative history.10
This would be akin to an investigator trying to determine what happened to a
patient in a hospital and, when investigating the hospital records, never both-
ering to ascertain which documents were drafted by a cardiologist, which by
a nurse, and which by a public relations official of the hospital. Authorship is
central to any initial assumptions about reliability. In other words, it gives us
clues about the capacity of the speaker to accurately explain something, as
well as about the motivations animating the speaker. Yet there is no schol-
6 Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193,
2193 (2017). For her part, Judge Barrett is skeptical of the interpretive utility of this process-
based turn.
7 See supra note 5. R
8 The term “legislative history” typically refers to a fixed universe of statements and doc-
uments generated during the legislative process in Congress, consisting of committee reports
and of statements made in hearings, committee markups, and on the floor of each chamber. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION 981–1021 (4th ed. 2007) (citing these documents as providing the current
universe of congressional legislative history). Some scholars, it is worth noting, have argued
for expanding this universe of documents—for example, to include cost estimates generated by
the Congressional Budget Office, Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the
Failure of Formalism, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 187–91 (2017), or presidential signing state-
ments, Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in the
Creation of Legislative History, 48 ARK. L. REV. 239 (1995).
9 See, e.g., infra notes 283–85.
10 There has been a growing awareness of the differentiations that exist in nonpartisan
congressional staff. See, e.g., Congressional Drafting Part I, supra note 5, at 968 (specifying R
the work of Legislative Counsel); Gluck, supra note 5, at 209 (specifying the work of the R
Congressional Budget Office); Shobe, supra note 5, at 822 (detailing the work of Legislative R
Counsel and the Congressional Research Service). There has not been a comparable apprecia-
tion of the differentiations that exist among partisan staff in Congress, however. For a full
typology of staff in the modern Congress, see infra Figure 1.
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arly or judicial understanding of who, exactly, drafts legislative history in
the modern Congress.
This Article attempts to remedy this situation. It documents the divi-
sions of labor that shape the drafting of legislative history in the modern
Congress. In pursuit of this end, the author conducted in-depth interviews for
this Article with thirty congressional staffers. Through these interviews, the
author discovered that three different actors draft the bulk of legislative his-
tory. First, some legislative history is drafted by committee legislative staff.11
Specifically, committee legislative staff takes sole drafting responsibility for
committee reports, and it assumes primary responsibility for statements
made by a Chair or Ranking Member of a committee or subcommittee, pro-
vided that the statement addresses a topic within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee or subcommittee. Second, some legislative history is drafted by
Member legislative staff—in particular, all other statements made at a com-
mittee hearing or markup. Third, legislative history also is drafted by Mem-
ber communications staff, a staff that plays a particularly prominent role in
the drafting of other floor statements.
These drafting assignments are notable because, as this Article chroni-
cles, each staffer type carries with it a unique job description. At the most
fundamental level, each staffer position exists to help the Members of Con-
gress achieve their goals in Congress. Yet Members of Congress possess and
pursue an amalgam of different goals. More specifically, as political scien-
tists have observed, Members of Congress can be conceptualized as possess-
ing—and as regularly acting upon—at least two distinct motivations. The
Member often hopes to implement his or her preferred policies, but this
Member also wants to get reelected.12 In the staff structure that Congress has
created for itself, these twin desires can be seen as projected out into the
differing missions and job descriptions of various staff. Each staff position is
tasked, in varying degree, with helping Members pursue one or both of these
goals. Committee legislative staff, on the one hand, are designed to focus
upon the accomplishment of policy goals. Member communications staff, on
the other hand, exist to assist in the pursuit of reelection (or, less tangibly, in
the pursuit by the Member of celebrity or a desirable public profile). Mem-
ber legislative staff, meanwhile, are expected to adopt a hybrid focus that
straddles these goals.
As interviews for this Article revealed, these differing job descriptions
lead to a host of subsidiary differences across different staffer types. For
committee legislative staff, a focus on policy development leads these staff-
ers to possess high levels of: (1) policy specialization; (2) policy expertise;
11 In the staffer descriptions used in this Article, the first term identifies the type of office
for which the individual works (viz., whether that office is run by a committee, an individual
Member of Congress, or party leadership). The second term identifies the staffer’s area of
focus within that office (e.g., whether they focus on advancing that office’s legislative goals or
its communications agenda).
12 See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973).
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(3) knowledge of particular bills; and (4) motivation to draft precise and
accurate legislative products. For Member legislative staff, meanwhile, a hy-
brid focus that straddles policy development and reelection efforts leads
these staffers, relative to their peers on committee legislative staff, to per-
form less well on the aforementioned dimensions. Finally, because Member
communications staff adopt an exclusive focus on constituent relations and
reelection efforts, they perform particularly poorly on each of these
dimensions.
When these four dimensions all mutually reinforce each other, this Arti-
cle argues, it is a potent indicator of reliability. In making this argument, the
Article largely accepts and works within prevailing theories of what it means
for legislative history to be “reliable.” Those who attempt some definition of
this term typically posit that “reliability” means that legislative history accu-
rately captures the underlying political deal or decision that it purports to
describe.13 William Eskridge has put important detail on this definition, asso-
ciating reliability with the following questions:
How likely does this source reflect the views or assumptions of the
enacting Congress? Is there a danger of strategic manipulation by
individual Members or biased groups seeking to “pack” the legis-
lative history? How well-informed is the source?14
This Article takes an approach to “reliability” that accepts the ideas embed-
ded in Eskridge’s helpful questions. It assumes that, in order to accurately
convey an underlying legislative deal, the author of legislative history must
possess: (1) the competence or expertise needed to understand and articulate
the deal; (2) actual knowledge of the deal; and (3) a professional motivation
or incentive to report the deal with accuracy.
Using this common concept of “reliability,” this Article proposes that,
based on the staffer differences it uncovers, statutory interpreters should
adopt a new hierarchy of legislative history materials.15 Within this hierar-
chy, priority is given to legislative history drafted by staff whose job
13 See, e.g., Dig. Realty Tr. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (describing committee reports as most reliable because they describe the understanding
of the Members who drafted and studied the legislation, and because they are used by other
Members to understand the legislation); Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825,
835 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] congressional conference report is recognized as the most reliable
evidence of congressional intent because it ‘represents the final statement of the terms agreed
to by both houses.’” (citing Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Block, 784 F.2d 895, 901 (9th Cir.
1986))); Congressional Drafting Part I, supra note 5, at 975 (defining “reliability” as refer- R
ring to “legislative history that actually does reflect the political deal that was made”).
14 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636 (1990).
15 Under the conventional approach to legislative history, the different types of legislative
history are ranked in a hierarchy of reliability. For review of the currently prevailing hierarchy,
see infra Part VI.A. Some have argued, it should be noted, that the very idea of a hierarchy of
legislative history is itself impractical or misleading. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 5, at R
109–10. See also Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1879–80 (1998) (noting that intentionalists often feel obligated to
move from the hierarchy to more contextual, case-by-case assessments of reliability). None-
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description focuses on policy development. By adopting this new hierarchy,
interpreters can prioritize statements that are drafted by institutional actors
who possess superior knowledge about the contents and goals of a bill, who
have the greatest ability to accurately report those contents and goals, and
who are under a heightened professional obligation to convey that informa-
tion precisely and accurately.
This new interpretive hierarchy views legislative history, in order of
decreasing reliability, as follows:
(1) Committee reports;
(2) All statements by a Chair or Ranking Member of a committee
or subcommittee on a topic within committee or subcommittee
jurisdiction;
(3) Other markup and hearing statements;
(4) Other floor statements.
It is a hierarchy that, in some cases, challenges prevailing wisdom. This
is seen, for example, in the proposed hierarchy’s contention that statements
by a committee Chair or Ranking Member should be prioritized—a break
with the currently-prevailing hierarchy, which instead prioritizes statements
by the introducing Member or floor sponsor.16 Similarly, this challenge is
seen in the notion that hearing and markup statements are more reliable than
floor statements.17
In other cases, the new hierarchy confirms prevailing wisdom, but it
places that wisdom on new foundations. This is seen, for example, in the
argument that committee reports are particularly reliable—but that this relia-
bility is not attributable to Members personally developing both the commit-
tee report and the underlying bill.18 Instead, it reveals that the reliability of
these reports results from several previously-unobserved factors, including
that: (1) they are drafted solely by committee legislative staffers, and (2)
theless, this Article accepts the premises that it is possible to rank legislative history according
to a hierarchy of reliability and that such a ranking is useful for the courts.
16 On the currently prevailing hierarchy, see infra Part VI.A. On the conventional wisdom
behind the prioritization of statements by the introducing Member or bill sponsor, see Andrew
E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically
Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 389 (1995) (“[C]omments by a bill’s
primary sponsor merit greater weight because the sponsor is familiar with the purposes of the
legislation and other members tend to rely heavily on the views of sponsors in deciding what
legislation means and how to vote.”); Eskridge, supra note 14, at 638 (“[Sponsor remarks are
prioritized] because the sponsors are the Members of Congress most likely to know what the
proposed legislation is all about, and other Members can be expected to pay special heed to
their characterizations of the legislation.”).
17 On the traditional view, see, for example, Eskridge, supra note 14, at 639 (speaking
uniformly of the reliability of “statements by legislators at hearings or on the floor”).
18 On the traditional logic, see, for example, Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“A
committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.”). See also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 8, at 982 (“Most legislation is essentially written in committee or subcommittee, and any
collective statement by the members of that subgroup will represent the best-informed thought
about what the proposed legislation is doing.”).
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they are written documents attributed to institutional authors and thereby are
not well-suited for television or social media.
In this way, the study conducted for this Article leads to a new hierar-
chy of legislative materials. At the same time, this study also uncovers a
number of additional insights about the inner workings of the modern Con-
gress—insights that have significant ramifications for the field of legislation.
Two warrant comment at the outset.
First, the study finds that committee reports regularly undergo a partic-
ular type of review prior to publication: namely, review by committee legis-
lative staff for the minority party. The discovery of this opposing-party
review is noteworthy, as it reveals that a central debate in the field of legisla-
tion has been misguided. For decades, textualists and intentionalists have
debated the significance of the fact that Members of Congress do not person-
ally review committee reports.19 In conducting this debate, both sides have
accepted the premise that Member review is the primary mechanism to
guard against nefarious staffers inserting misleading statements into these
reports. The discovery of this opposing-party review practice reveals that,
contrary to what the debating parties have assumed, Congress has developed
an entirely different institutional mechanism to ensure report accuracy. It is a
discovery that bolsters confidence that, contrary to assertions by some textu-
alists, committee reports are not a fertile ground for nefarious, unchecked
staffers to insert misleading material into the legislative record.20
Second, this study also brings previously-unnoticed congressional ac-
tors to the fore. Most notably, it does not appear that there has been any
acknowledgment or discussion in the legal literature, prior to this Article, of
a particular type of congressional staffer: the communications staffer.21 Yet,
as interviews for this Article revealed, this staffer now plays a central role in
shaping the dialogue between Members of Congress and the public. Increas-
19 For a review of this debate, see infra Part VI.C.
20 For the textualist arguments on this front—the most notable of which have been ad-
vanced by Justice Scalia and Judge Kozinski—see infra note 284 and accompanying text.
21 For example, a search of Westlaw for law review articles containing the terms “Con-
gress” and “communications staff” turned up no results of articles mentioning these staffs in
Congress. Searched February 10, 2019. Westlaw search results. WESTLAW, http://
next.westlaw.com (filter Content to only include “Secondary Sources” and then further filter
for “Law Reviews & Journals”; use Advanced Search to find documents that have the term
“Congress” and This Exact Phrase “communications staff”). While obviously not a perfect
proxy for scholarly silence, this does capture the general blindness to these congressional ac-
tors. There has been some greater awareness of these staffers among political communications
scholars, who have discussed the rise of press secretaries and of communications operations by
congressional leadership. See generally TIMOTHY E. COOK, MAKING LAWS AND MAKING
NEWS: MEDIA STRATEGIES IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1989); Amy Fried &
Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the Polls, 72 HISTORIAN 321 (2010); Douglas B. Harris,
Recovering History and Discovering Data in the Archives: An Alternative Mode of Research
for Congress Scholars, in AN AMERICAN POLITICAL ARCHIVES READER 429 (Karen Dawley
Paul et al. eds., 2009); Douglas B. Harris, The Rise of the Public Speakership, 113 POL. SCI. Q.
193 (1998); Michael J. Robinson, Three Faces of Congressional Media, in THE NEW CON-
GRESS 55 (Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds., 1981).
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ingly, these staffers are using floor speeches not as protracted arguments, for
example, but instead as a series of staccato quips that are suited to the con-
straints of social media platforms. Through this and other reforms, commu-
nications staffers are remaking a Member-constituent dialogue that is central
to the democratic architecture written into our Constitution.22 The insertion
of a new actor into this architecture is a significant event, and this Article
begins to shine a light on the role this actor plays in the modern Congress, as
well as to consider its implications.
The study found in the ensuing pages provides additional discoveries
about the modern Congress as well. It offers further lessons for the practice
of statutory interpretation, and it highlights a number of institutional reforms
for consideration by Congress. Moreover, by showing the many insights that
can be gained from a detailed study of the inner workings of Congress, it
seeks to illustrate that there still are many lessons yet to be learned from the
“process-based turn” in legislation scholarship.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part II outlines the universe of con-
gressional staffers, thereby providing context for the subsequent study. The
next three Parts present the findings of the study: Part III documents the
differences between the three types of staffers who draft legislative history,
Part IV chronicles the drafting assignments for legislative history in Con-
gress, and Part V explains the underlying logic of these assignments. Part VI
then details the implications that the study holds for statutory interpretation,
as well as for potential institutional reform of Congress. Part VII briefly
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND: DIVISION OF LABOR IN CONGRESS
To understand the drafting assignments for legislative history in Con-
gress, it can be useful to have some context about Congress’s divisions of
labor. Within Congress, staffers divide into two broad categories. First, a
number of staffers in Congress are nonpartisan staffers.23 These staffers are
employed by a nonpartisan legislative office that Congress has created for
itself; consequently, they provide assistance to members of both political
22 For just a few of the many different scholarly approaches that converge on the idea that
this Member-constituent dialogue is central to the constitutional scheme, see generally BRUCE
ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing that the dualist structure of the
Constitution is designed to require those with bold reform proposals to engage in sustained
dialogue with the public over multiple election cycles); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 742 (2012) (arguing that the Speech or Debate Clause enshrines a
constitutional commitment to the value of communication with constituents).
23 For discussions of various nonpartisan offices in Congress, see, for example, Congres-
sional Drafting Part II, supra note 5, at 739–47 (discussing Offices of the Legislative Coun-
sel); Gluck, supra note 8, at 187–91 (2017) (discussing Congressional Budget Office); Shobe,
supra note 5, at 818–43 (discussing Offices of the Legislative Counsels and Congressional
Research Service); Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t Find in the United States Code, 40
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 143–47 (2010) (discussing Law Revision Counsel and Offices
of the Legislative Counsels).
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parties inside Congress. Nonpartisan offices within Congress include the
following:
• Offices of the Legislative Counsels;
• Congressional Budget Office;
• Congressional Research Service;
• Offices of the Parliamentarians;
• Law Revision Counsel.
Meanwhile, a second type of staffer also exists within Congress: the
partisan staffer. Rather than working for the institution of Congress (and
therefore providing assistance on a bipartisan basis), partisan staffers work
on behalf of, and only provide assistance to, a specific partisan actor inside
Congress.24 There are three types of partisan staffers within Congress, and
they are divided according to the category of partisan actor that employs
them.
First, each individual Member of Congress is permitted to employ a
number of partisan staffers (known colloquially as “Member staff” or “per-
sonal staff”).25 As of 2016, Members of the House of Representatives em-
ployed an average of 7.22 staffers per Representative in their Washington
offices,26 while Senate offices employed an average of 23.42 such staffers
per Senator.27 Second, each committee of Congress employs both majority
and minority staff. As of 2016, the committees of the House of Representa-
tives employed an average of 54 staffers per committee (with the per-com-
mittee number varying from 18 to 119 staffers),28 while the committees of
the Senate employed an average of 52.95 staffers per committee (with the
per-committee number varying from 14 to 133 staffers).29 Finally, there are
several partisan offices that, through their staff, work on a chamber-wide
basis to coordinate party activity across Members and committees (known
colloquially as “leadership staff”). As of 2016, House leadership offices em-
ployed a total of 239 individuals,30 while Senate leadership offices employed
160 individuals.31
Each of these three partisan staff categories is subdivided, moreover,
according to the nature of the tasks performed by the staff. For example,
Member staff subdivides into the following categories: (1) office support
staff; (2) legislative staff; (3) communications staff; and (4) supervisory
staff.32 Committee staff subdivides into the same categories, except that it
24 See generally HOUSE STAFF, supra note 3; SENATE STAFF, supra note 3. R
25 See generally HOUSE STAFF, supra note 3; SENATE STAFF, supra note 3. R
26
HOUSE STAFF, supra note 3, at 12. R
27
SENATE STAFF, supra note 3,  at 8. R
28 See HOUSE STAFF, supra note 3, at 13 (number excludes joint committees). R
29 See SENATE STAFF, supra note 3, at 9 (number excludes joint committees). R
30
HOUSE STAFF, supra note 3, at 6.
31
SENATE STAFF, supra note 3, at 4.
32 For a more detailed discussion of staff categorization, see generally CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., STAFF PAY LEVELS FOR SELECTED POSITIONS IN HOUSE MEMBER OFFICES, 2001–2015
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includes the additional category of oversight staff.33 (Leadership staff have
somewhat different subdivisions that are not relevant to this project, and
consequently are not explored here.)
Taken together, this office-based staffing information provides a com-
prehensive view of modern congressional staff. A graphic depiction of that
staff universe is offered in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Divisions of Labor in Congress.
As Figure 1 makes evident, the modern Congress is populated by a
variety of institutional actors. This Article focuses its inquiry upon a specific
subset of these congressional actors: namely, the staffers that produce the set
of documents and statements that, taken together, courts refer to as “legisla-
tive history.” This raises the question: Of the many congressional actors
identified in Figure 1, which actors are responsible for drafting the various
types of legislative history?
Through interviews with congressional staffers that were conducted for
this Article, it was discovered that three institutional actors within Congress
generate the bulk of this legislative history: (1) committee legislative staff;
(2) Member legislative staff; and (3) Member communications staff.34 These
three actors will be the focus of the study reported in Parts III through V. To
assist the reader in understanding where these three actors fit within the
larger institution of Congress, Figure 2 below highlights them (black box,
white text).
(2016) [hereinafter HOUSE STAFF PAY LEVELS]; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF PAY LEVELS
FOR SELECTED POSITIONS IN SENATORS’ OFFICES, FY 2001–FY 2015 (2016) [hereinafter SEN-
ATE STAFF PAY LEVELS]; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL STAFF: DUTIES AND FUNC-
TIONS OF SELECTED POSITIONS (2010), [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL STAFF].
33 See SENATE STAFF PAY LEVELS, supra note 32.
34 See infra Parts III through V.
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Figure 2. Divisions of Labor in Congress (Legislative History Drafters
Highlighted).
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STAFFER TYPES
As Part II explained, three types of staffer take the main responsibility
for drafting legislative history in the modern Congress: (1) committee legis-
lative staff; (2) Member legislative staff; and (3) Member communications
staff. To better understand the nature of these staff positions, thirty congres-
sional staffers were asked a host of questions about these positions. To-
gether, these staffers have worked in eighty-four different positions within
Congress. Interviewees were drawn from both parties, both chambers of
Congress, and a wide range of committee and Member offices. They were
selected in an effort to get perspectives from individuals with different posi-
tions and backgrounds in Congress, as well as from individuals at different
points in their careers within Congress. The interviews were semi-structured
in nature; planned questions were posed to interviewees that, while open-
ended, nonetheless would permit for coding by response, and spontaneous
follow-up questions were posed in order to invite interviewees to provide
detail and elaboration on their initial answers.
Taken together, the answers from these staffers provide a composite
portrait of each type of congressional staffer. This Part presents these com-
posite portraits. The profile of each staffer type is divided into five catego-
ries with respect to which, according to interviewees, these staffers
meaningfully differ. Those categories are: (1) job description; (2) portfolio;
(3) policy expertise; (4) knowledge of individual bills; and (5) intended
audience.
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A. Committee Legislative Staff
1. Job Description
The committee legislative staffer is directed, with the most single-
minded focus, to assist Members in their goal of developing and pursuing
policy objectives. According to interviewees, committee legislative staff are
expected to cultivate policy expertise, and to bring that expertise to bear on
legislative materials in order to ensure their precision and accuracy.35 As one
interviewee put it: “public policy is what [committee legislative staffers]
do.”36
This exclusive focus upon national policy development is attributable,
in part, to the fact that this staffer is a legislative staffer. Interviewees ex-
plained the significance of this label as follows:
• “The legislative side of congressional work is pretty focused on
coming up with a policy, and working to make sure that the idea
is put into legislative text—and when it reaches the Code, that
it’s interpreted in the way that it was intended.”37
• “[Legislative staff] have to work on drafting legislation, and
reading regulations . . . and [developing] the nitty-gritty of the
policy, rather than the overall conversations with press and
pushing stories.”38
• “The legislative team is developing all your substance [and]
doing anything policy-related. They are the subject-matter ex-
perts. . . . The ‘leg’ team is doing substantive work that requires
the analysis of the actual underlying law and policy.”39
As the interview responses made clear, legislative staff in Congress have a
job description that prioritizes the development, and the proper implementa-
tion, of policy objectives.40
This legislative focus is heightened by the fact that these staffers are
employed by a unique type of institution—a committee—rather than by a
Member of Congress. As interviewees explained, employment by a Member
of Congress unavoidably entails a focus on advancing the Member’s goal of
35 For background on the role of committee legislative staff, see supra Part II and accom-
panying text.
36 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
37 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
38 Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
39 Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
40 See Interview with No. 12, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“The legislative staff focuses
mostly on analyzing and coming up with legislation—making policy recommendations.”); In-
terview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“[Legislative staff’s] goal is more develop-
ing good policy. . . . They design and assemble the car. . . . They’re like engineers—they
decided to put fuel injection in the engine instead of a carburetor, and they’ll talk to you until
you fall asleep about the merits of doing that.”); Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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reelection. This leads to a myopic focus on the Member’s constituency—a
focus that often exists in tension with the goal of developing and coherently
articulating national policy. By contrast, committee staffers are liberated
from these electoral concerns, and they therefore can focus squarely upon
national policy development.41 As interviewees described it:
• “The lens is different, I guess is the best way to describe it. The
committee has a jurisdictional lens, it has a historical lens that a
Member’s office may not have. Their lens is much more their
district—the stakeholders, their personal political beliefs. But
it’s not as long-looking.”42
• “Usually with Member offices, it’s very constituency-focused,
in my experience at least. And for committee staff, it’s both con-
stituency, Member-district [focused] but also thinking about the
bigger picture and what the goal is for the legislation.”43
• “Committee staff are more [focused] at a national level, look-
ing at things as a whole in the big picture of things, instead of
catering to one specific constituency or one specific part of the
country.”44
• “Personal offices also really get bogged down in the parochial
issues of their state or their district in a way that [committees do
not]. . . . The committee ha[s] a more national focus. . . . You
started with the idea that you were going to try to make good
policy. Now, of course, that gets shot to hell when you negotiate
anyway. But at least starting from a purer place.”45
In short, committee legislative staff is tasked with focusing upon na-
tional policy development for legislation, and the position is rationally struc-
tured in order to insulate the staffer from parochial constituency-based
concerns. The position is designed to allow the staffer to cultivate policy
expertise—and to employ that expertise in the development and negotiation
of legislation. This job description shapes all facets of the job, as seen in the
domains discussed below.
41 See, e.g., Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Personal office staff,
their job is to get their Member wins. Committee staff [are] in charge of the programs. . . . We
also have to think about just keeping the programs strong and sound.”); Interview with No. 16,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“On the committee level, they’re not thinking so much about
constituents. They’re thinking a lot more of the programs that their jurisdiction covers.”); see
also Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer,
in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 28, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
42 Interview with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
43 Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
44 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
45 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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2. Portfolio / Specialization
Among the different types of congressional staffers, committee legisla-
tive staffs have the narrowest legislative portfolios. Interviewees for this Ar-
ticle provided robust consensus on this point; twenty-three interviewees
advanced this assertion, while none contradicted it. As one interviewee suc-
cinctly put it: “Committee [legislative] staff are the specialists.”46
In part, the narrowness of these staffers’ portfolios is attributable to the
fact that they are employees of a committee with a fixed jurisdiction. Ac-
cording to interviewees, however, committee legislative staffers additionally
specialize by topic to a far greater extent than is required by their jurisdic-
tional constraints. Committee legislative staffers, they reported, often will
have a portfolio that is limited not only to a specific topic (e.g., health care
or agriculture), nor only to a specific program within that topic (e.g., Medi-
caid or the SNAP program), but also to a specific subset of a program (e.g.,
Part B of the Medicare program).47 Moreover, interviewees noted, committee
legislative staffers do not have portfolios that include non-legislative tasks,
such as responding to constituent mail, that some Member legislative staff
may be expected to perform.48
Two interviewees also mentioned the possibility that committee legisla-
tive staffers in the Senate may have narrower portfolios than their counter-
parts in the House.49 However, one of these interviewees also emphasized
that the portfolio difference across chambers was not as significant as the
portfolio difference across staffer types, as those staffer types are sorted in
this Part.50
3. Policy Expertise
Among congressional staffers, committee legislative staffers also pos-
sess the most policy expertise. Twenty-one interviewees asserted that com-
mittee legislative staffers possess a policy expertise that is superior to that of
their peers, while none contradicted this claim. As one interviewee put it:
46 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
47 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
48 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
49 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
50 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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“Committee [legislative] staff is expected to be the subject matter
experts.”51
Interviewees noted four different features of the job that ensure this
superior policy expertise. First, as discussed above, committee legislative
staff specialize to a greater degree than do their peers. The narrowness of
their portfolios allows committee legislative staffers to study their assigned
policy areas at a high level of depth and detail.52 As one interviewee put it:
“When you specialize that deeply, you’re going to naturally wind up with
people who are much more expert on it. If they weren’t at the beginning,
they will be after a year. Because that’s all they’ve studied for a year.”53
Interviewees mentioned that the narrowness of the portfolios permits com-
mittee legislative staff to have superior in-depth knowledge of both statutory
text54 and regulatory developments.55
Second, this superior policy expertise is compounded by the fact that,
relative to their peers, committee legislative staff remain in their positions
for longer durations. Studies by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
have documented this fact about staff tenure; as these studies have chroni-
cled, committee legislative staff retain their positions for modestly longer
tenures, on average, than do committee communications staffers, Member
legislative staffers, or Member communications staffers.56 These CRS stud-
ies were based on data sets that had several acknowledged shortcomings,57
but interviewees provided anecdotal evidence suggesting that these short-
comings may have led the CRS studies, if anything, to understate the tenure
gaps between committee legislative staffers and their peers.58 Interviewees
51 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
52 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.
53 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
54 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
55 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
56 On committee communications staff, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF TENURE IN
SELECTED POSITIONS IN HOUSE COMMITTEES, 2006–2016 7 (2016) [hereinafter HOUSE COM-
MITTEE STAFF TENURE]; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF TENURE IN SELECTED POSITIONS IN
SENATE COMMITTEES, 2006–2016 7 (2016) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE STAFF TENURE].
On Member legislative staffers and Member communications staffers, see CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., STAFF TENURE IN SELECTED POSITIONS IN HOUSE MEMBER OFFICES, 2006–2016 7
(2016) [hereinafter HOUSE MEMBER STAFF TENURE].
57 See HOUSE COMMITTEE STAFF TENURE, supra note 56, at 2–7; SENATE COMMITTEE
STAFF TENURE, supra note 56, at 2–7; HOUSE MEMBER STAFF TENURE, supra note 56, at 2–7.
58 Several interviewees noted tenure gaps and turnover concerns as exacerbating gaps in
policy experience. See Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C. Many committee legislative staffers described internal promotion practices, and
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pointed to staff tenure gaps as exacerbating the effects of specialization,
whereby committee legislative staff possess greater policy expertise than do
their peers.
Third, these staffers possess superior policy expertise on account of
committee hiring and staffing practices.59 Interviewees consistently de-
scribed two backgrounds that committees seek out for legislative staffer po-
sitions: experience doing legislative work in Member offices or time spent
developing expertise in the private sector or executive agencies.60 Each of
these backgrounds ensures that committee legislative staffers possess policy
expertise. As one interviewee explained:
At the committees, I think that they do tend to hire for specific
policy expertise. [Committees] hire a fair number of people who
acquired their policy expertise working their way up, through
Member [offices], working on legislative issues. [They also] get
some people who have graduate degrees in the specific areas, and
then for some kinds of expertise, [they] get people from the
agencies.61
When hiring for committee legislative staff, committees also will seek
out individuals with advanced degrees in law and policy—a prioritization of
policy-based educational experience to an extent not seen in other staff posi-
tions.62 By hiring individuals with both professional and educational back-
grounds in policy-related work, committees ensure that their legislative
staffs possess high levels of policy expertise.
experience moving back and forth between committees and agencies, that would lead the CRS
studies to reset their tenure count. See, e.g., Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.
59 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 4, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 18,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
60 On these two paths, see Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. On the
path from Member staff, see Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. On the path from an agency
or the private sector, see Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
61 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
62 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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Fourth, this superior policy expertise is further compounded by the fact
that these staffers have greater access to outside experts. As one committee
legislative staffer put it:
With our stuff, too, it’s not just us. We get access to support that
the personal offices don’t have access to. . . . We get so much
support from the implementers . . . we get a lot of support from
CBO [i.e., the Congressional Budget Office], we can even tap into
[congressional commissions], so we’re getting support from peo-
ple who also are as expert as we are in these areas that the personal
offices don’t have access to.63
In some cases, this differential access to outside experts is even required by
law. The statute that created the House Office of the Legislative Counsel, for
example, requires attorneys in that drafting office to prioritize committee
inquiries over Member-office inquiries.64
Two interviewees also suggested that, among committee legislative
staffers, some gap in policy experience may exist across chambers.65 Specifi-
cally, they suggested that committee legislative staff in the Senate may have
superior expertise on average. One interviewee attributed this to a greater
degree of specialization in the Senate staff,66 while the other attributed it to
the slower pace of the Senate.67
4. Knowledge of Bill
Committee legislative staff have high levels of direct exposure to, and
intimate knowledge of, the contents of individual bills. They regularly de-
velop policies for bills that move through Congress—and they will work
with the Offices of the Legislative Counsel to develop the text for those
bills. Moreover, when committee legislative staff is tasked with drafting leg-
islative history for a bill that was developed at the committee level, they
typically will assign the drafting of that legislative history to the same staffer
who developed the underlying bill.68 In this way, committee legislative staffs
ensure that, when drafting legislative history, they are able to leverage their
institutional knowledge about a given bill.
This sets committee legislative staff apart, in particular, from communi-
cations staffers (as discussed in greater detail in Part III.C). Evidence was
less compelling regarding the differences between committee legislative
staff and Member legislative staff on this point. Five interviewees asserted
63 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
64 See 2 U.S.C. § 281b (2018).
65 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
66 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
67 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
68 See infra Part IV.A.
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that committee legislative staff has superior knowledge of individual bills,
while two interviewees posited that knowledge of bills was too varied to
permit generalization. While not indisputable, therefore, the interviews
nonetheless allowed for a tentative conclusion that, in the words of one inter-
viewee: “The Member offices usually depend a lot on the committee staff
for information about the bill, and [for] understanding the bill . . .
[whereas] at the committee, we deal a little more with original source
material.”69
5. Intended Audience
A number of interviewees volunteered the idea that committee legisla-
tive staff, by virtue of their job description, consistently target a specific
intended audience with their documents and statements: legal implement-
ers.70 This includes both courts and executive agencies.71 Interviewees also
reported that, when addressing legal implementers, congressional staffers
generally strive for honesty, accuracy, and precision.72 According to the in-
terviewees, a good-faith effort is made to convey congressional intent to
these audiences73 and to provide them with Congress’s understanding of the
underlying policy arguments.74
The description of this goal—i.e., of accurate communication with im-
plementers—fits with the fact that, more broadly, interviewees described
committee legislative staff as under a heightened expectation to promote and
ensure statement accuracy.75 As interviewees put it:
69 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
70 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
71 On agencies, see Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. On courts, see Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
72 See Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
73 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
74 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
75 See, e.g., Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“The policy people [on
committee] are responsible [for] the factual accuracy of it.”); see also Interview with No. 1,
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• “[Committee legislative staffers] would edit for substance.
Make sure everything is correct, making sure that the represen-
tations of the legislation is correct.”76
• “If our ‘leg’ folks [on committee] write them, then you know
that they’re going to be factually accurate.”77
Admittedly, there is reason to view these audience-related claims with
some skepticism, as interviewees might be expected to describe even mis-
leading statements as accurate (as part of an effort to induce reliance on
those statements). Yet, as Sections III.B and III.C will illustrate, interview-
ees were not afraid to confess that certain staffs, when targeting certain audi-
ences, do pursue goals other than accurate and precise communication. In so
doing, interviewees provided some reason to believe the assertions that com-
mittee legislative staffers, when addressing legal implementers, strive for
accuracy.
B. Member Legislative Staff
1. Job Description
The Member legislative staffer is best understood as a hybrid actor who
is expected to straddle, and simultaneously pursue, the two Member goals
noted above (namely, achieving policy objectives and achieving Member
reelection).
On the one hand, Member legislative staffers are, as their name implies,
legislative staffers. Consequently, their job description is focused upon pol-
icy development.78 In the office of an individual Member of Congress, it is
the Member legislative staffers who take responsibility for understanding
public policy, for assisting the Member in decision-making with respect to
public policy, and for ensuring accuracy in the Member’s statements regard-
ing public policy.
At the same time, however, the Member legislative staffer still works
for a specific Member of Congress. As a consequence, the Member legisla-
tive staffer also is expected to adopt a district-centric or state-centric focus,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
76 Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
77 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
78 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 5, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 12, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 15,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C. For quotations by interviewees that explain the implications of the
“legislative staffer” label, see supra Part III.A.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\hll102.txt unknown Seq: 21  6-JAN-20 14:57
2020] Legislative History in the Modern Congress 111
with an eye toward constituents and reelection. Gluck and Bressman previ-
ously documented this dimension of the Member legislative staff position,
and interviews for this article confirmed their findings.79 Describing this
constituency-oriented component of the Member legislative staff position,
interviewees said:
• “[Member staff] are trying to ultimately to make all of [their]
work reflect [their] constituents and [their] district, and back
home.”80
• “Personal office staff, their job is to get their Member wins.”81
• “Usually with Member offices, it’s very constituency-
focused.”82
• “[In terms of] priorities . . . sometimes it’s just [that, for Mem-
ber legislative staffers,] politics takes over. And that’s a differ-
ent priority.”83
• “You’re developing an expertise in running it through the code-
switcher or prism of the [state’s or district’s] interests.”84
While directed to focus on policy development, therefore, Member leg-
islative staff nonetheless are expected to retain a knowledge of, and to focus
upon, the goals of the Member with his or her constituency.85 In this way, the
position of Member legislative staffer is one that is expected to straddle the
twin goals of advancing policy objectives, on the one hand, and pursuing
Member reelection, on the other hand. This hybrid quality of the Member
legislative staffer is reflected in many aspects of the job, as discussed below.
2. Portfolio / Specialization
The hybrid nature of this staff position is evident, for example, in the
breadth of the policy portfolios assigned to these staffers. Member legisla-
79 Congressional Drafting Part II, supra note 5, at 755–56. R
80 Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
81 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also interview with No. 28,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
82 Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
83 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
84 Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. See also Interview with No. 5
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 18 Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
85 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Member staff is much more in
tune to the district, and what’s going on there.”); Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C. (“You can either ask district-centric questions, or higher-level questions—basi-
cally, ‘What do you think of cuts to [a specific] industry?’ As opposed to . . . ‘My district has
[an affected] facility that’s been cut thirteen percent, can you talk to that?’ So, one would be a
committee-add question, one would be a personal office question.”); Interview with No. 11,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Personal offices also really get bogged down in the parochial
issues of their state or their district in a way that [committees do not].”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\hll102.txt unknown Seq: 22  6-JAN-20 14:57
112 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
tive staff usually do specialize, at least to some extent, by content area.86
Interviewees consistently reported that a Member legislative staffer typically
would be assigned a portfolio that was limited to a specific subset of policy
areas.87 Relatedly, sixteen interviewees mentioned that Member legislative
staff have narrower portfolios than Member communications staff, and zero
interviewees contradicted this claim.88
Nonetheless, Member legislative staffers have much broader portfolios
than do their committee counterparts. This is particularly true of Member
legislative staffers in the House of Representatives, where Member legisla-
tive staffers will be responsible—by themselves—for a startlingly large
number of different policy areas.89 Describing this phenomenon, staffers
remarked:
• “[In a personal office,] you generally have three staffers that’re
in charge of [monitoring] the entirety of the federal govern-
ment. . . . Imagine you’re in a meeting on health care, you’re
watching a floor vote on transportation because you’re going to
have vote recs ready to go, you’ve got [Legislative Counsel]
calling you on an energy bill you have going, and the boss
comes in and asks a question about tax reform. It is impossible
for anyone to know everything about any of those issues, [much
less know everything about each] branch of one of those
issues.”90
• “If you’re a staffer for a House member, you’re usually handling
several different issues. I would say—I think I handle seven. So,
you have to be able to switch gears, and learn—be talking about
health care one minute, and talking about agriculture the next,
and then education later in the day.”91
In the House, moreover, Member legislative staffers also will handle
non-legislative tasks on occasion. These tasks might include speechwriting,92
86 But see Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (suggesting that, occasionally, a single legislative staffer might
cover all issues).
87 Fifteen interviewees gave examples of typical Member legislative portfolios, for exam-
ple, that were limited to specific policy areas.
88 Member communications staff do not specialize by policy area.
89 See, e.g., Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“As personal office staff
. . . [you might have a portfolio that covers] health, veterans, education, and labor.”); Inter-
view with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Personal office staff have huge portfolios—
they need to know everything.”); Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“It’s
fun, because you do get to learn about a lot of different things. But then sometimes, you’re just
like, oh man, I cover the postal service, and there’s a postal bill on the floor that I know
nothing about—who am I going to call to get the read on this?”); see also Interview with No.
20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
90 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
91 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
92 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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drafting of constituent mail,93 holding of constituent meetings,94 and manag-
ing of “parochial issues” that may arise.95 As one interviewee put it: “You
have to do all kinds of things. You’re spread way more thin.”96
In the Senate, by contrast, Member legislative staffers typically have
more manageable portfolios. As one interviewee put it: “In the Senate, you
can have just one or two issues.”97 Moreover, Member legislative staffers in
the Senate typically are not required to handle non-legislative tasks.98 None-
theless, Member legislative staffers in the Senate still have portfolios that,
when compared to those of committee legislative staff, are very broad. A
Member legislative staffer in the Senate typically will handle, without assis-
tance, the entirety of a single policy area—where a “policy area” is defined
as a broad subject-area (such as agriculture, defense, transportation, or
health). As a result, even interviewees who suggested that a House-Senate
specialization gap existed nonetheless underscored the fact that, even in the
Senate, there also remains a significant specialization gap between commit-
tee legislative staff and Member legislative staff.99
3. Policy Expertise
Relative to their congressional peers, Member legislative staff possess
an intermediate level of policy expertise. On the one hand, Member legisla-
tive staffers generally possess a lower level of policy expertise than do com-
mittee legislative staff. As discussed above, twenty-one interviewees
supported this claim, while none contradicted it. As one Member legislative
staffer put it: “I don’t scratch the surface of committee [legislative staff’s]
knowledge about policy. I can’t hold a candle to them.”100
On the other hand, Member legislative staffers still do possess some
policy expertise—a trait that distinguishes them from Member communica-
tions staffers. Sixteen interviewees mentioned that, relative to Member com-
93 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
94 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
95 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. “Parochial issues” often involve
local disputes or problems that the Member may be able to resolve or influence simply by
exerting informal pressure on governmental or private actors, such as by calling an executive
agency to lobby on behalf of certain treatment for local businesses.
96 Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
97 Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 4,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
98 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
99 See Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“There’s definitely a gap [in
specialization].”). But see interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (giving mixed
information on this element).
100 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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munications staff, Member legislative staff possess superior expertise, while
no interviewees contradicted this claim.
In part, this intermediate level of policy expertise is linked, once again,
to the varying levels of staff specialization. By covering more policy topics
than would a committee legislative staffer, the Member legislative staffer is
not afforded the opportunity to cultivate a comparable level of policy exper-
tise while on the job. According to one interviewee: “On the personal staff
side, you have to know a little bit about everything. [As a result, you need
to] know who to ask, where to find information if you don’t know what
you’re talking about . . . [because] it’s not something that you’ve studied or
learned in your time as a staffer.”101
Inside Congress, this knowledge gap with committee legislative staff—
and its connection to the narrowness of staffer portfolios—is captured in an
oft-repeated analogy. Whereas committee legislative staffers have portfolios
that are “an inch wide and a mile deep,” it is said, Member legislative staff-
ers have portfolios that are “a mile wide and an inch deep.” Nine different
interviewees used this metaphor. Elaborating upon the logic behind this
phrase, one interviewee noted: “On the committee, because of that [nar-
rower focus], the staff are really, really experts in their one area . . . .
Whereas in the personal office . . . it’s not uncommon to also cover four or
five issues that you really don’t know much about, and [the staffer is] just
kind of learning on-the-go.”102 In other words, Member offices do not hire
legislative staff in numbers that permit them to subdivide work to the extent
that occurs on committees—and, as a result, Member legislative staffers find
that: “You’re just stretched thinner.”103
The intermediate level of policy expertise among Member legislative
staff is also attributable to Member hiring and staffing decisions. On the one
hand, Member legislative staff will be selected partly due to their ability (or,
at least, their promise) with respect to substantive policy development.104 On
the other hand, however, Member legislative staff also will be selected, in
many instances, for their knowledge of the Member’s constituency—a com-
peting hiring interest that detracts from Member efforts to seek out individu-
als with policy expertise.105 As one interviewee put it: “Oftentimes . . . you
101 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 2,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
102 Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
103 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
104 See Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 4, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
(describing the varying extents to which Member offices hire for policy expertise).
105 On the hiring priority for individuals from the home state or district, see Interview with
No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. On
the lower priority given to hiring for policy expertise generally, see Interview with No. 2,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 4, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
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have a Member that will get someone from their geography . . . . That may
be more important to a Member than someone with a law degree, or some-
one who has an MBA, or someone who has [a certain] number of years in
the field.”106 Moreover, even if Member legislative staff is hired for policy
expertise in some areas, the breadth of the staffer’s portfolio necessarily
means that he or she will cover issues beyond the staffer’s realm of
expertise.107
Finally, two interviewees also mentioned the possibility that Senate
Member legislative staff may, on average, possess a level of policy expertise
that is superior to that of their counterparts in the House.108 However, the
low number of interviewees who raised this chamber-to-chamber compari-
son makes it difficult to draw conclusions on this matter.
4. Knowledge of Bill
The number of interviewees who discussed staffer differences regarding
exposure to, and knowledge of, individual bills was relatively small. As a
consequence, the conclusions that can be drawn on this topic are tentative.
Nonetheless, among those interviewees who did raise this issue, Member
legislative staff were consistently described as possessing an intermediate
level of knowledge about individual bills in Congress.
On the one hand, interviewees asserted that Member legislative staff
typically have a smaller amount of direct exposure to individual bills than do
committee legislative staff, as Part III.A documented. Among those who
suggested that Member legislative staff have lower levels of exposure to
(and knowledge of) individual bills, several emphasized the idea that Mem-
ber legislative staff often gain knowledge of a bill’s contents by reading sum-
mary materials furnished to them by committee staff, whereas committee
legislative staff are more likely to gain their knowledge of a bill by develop-
ing or reading the actual bill text.109 As one interviewee remarked: “Very
often [the Member legislative staffer] would have been involved in the ne-
gotiations within the committees over a bill, but they wouldn’t have held first
with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
106 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
107 Several interviewees emphasized that the tenure gap contributes to a concomitant gap
in policy expertise between legislative staffs at the Member and committee levels. See, e.g.,
Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 18,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
108 Interview with No. 12, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C. But see Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
109 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 2, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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pen, they wouldn’t have interacted with Leg[islative] Counsel, except
maybe on an amendment that they were issuing in markup.”110
On the other hand, interviewees made it clear that Member legislative
staff certainly have more interactions with legislative materials than do
Member communications staffers. Admittedly, only five staffers explicitly
offered this comparative assessment—yet zero interviewees contradicted it.
Moreover, interviewees seemingly omitted this information because it was
viewed as too obvious to warrant comment; when explicitly asked about it,
several interviewees laughed at the question, for example. It was common-
sense to these interviewees that, while Member legislative staff may have
varied exposure to individual bills in Congress, Member communications
staff are uniformly devoid of this exposure. Summarizing this difference,
one interviewee explained: “They’re generally two distinct roles—[and
only] one is focused on the policy and the bill text.”111
5. Intended Audience
Interviewees suggested that, when Member legislative staff draft legis-
lative history, they tend to target a hybrid audience. Relative to committee
legislative staff, it was claimed, Member legislative staff draft legislative
history with a greater focus on communicating to the Member’s local constit-
uency.112 Relative to Member communications staff, however, it was claimed
that Member legislative staff draft with an increased focus on communicat-
ing with implementers and regulated entities.113 The result, therefore, was an
image of Member legislative staff as staff whose job description is split be-
tween two Member objectives—namely, reelection and achieving policy
goals—and who consequently must draft legislative history in a way that
balances competing objectives of reaching implementers, on the one hand,
and of persuading potential voters, on the other hand.
110 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
111 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
112 Id.; Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 5, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 28,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
113 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 2, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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C. Member Communications Staff
1. Job Description
Of the various types of congressional staff, the Member communica-
tions staffer is most squarely focused upon the goal of Member reelection.
This is not to say that Member communications staffs perform campaign
work in any narrow or technical sense (something that, if true, would consti-
tute a violation of chamber ethics rules).114 Rather, they are focused more
broadly upon the task of promoting a positive perception of the Member
among the general public. In the words of one interviewee, the Member
communications staff is: “A team that is generating the [Member’s] public
image.”115 To this end, their job description focuses on the task of communi-
cating persuasively with the public—and, in particular, with the constituents
of an individual Member of Congress. While this communication may be
done primarily to inform the public about the viewpoints or actions of the
Member, it inevitably is done with an eye toward eventual electoral
consequences.
The job description for Member communications staff is focused, there-
fore, on the task of shaping communications for a particular audience. In
part, it is an audience of busy generalists with limited bandwidth. Conse-
quently, these staffers are expected to put Member ideas and viewpoints into
language that is accessible and brief. Several interviewees referred to this as
a “translation” function of the position,116 while others described it as the
task of putting things “in layman’s terms.”117 Elaborating, interviewees said:
• “You want the ‘comms’ people to come in and explain how this
affects the everyday person. Not the judicial side, not the legal
side. . . . That’s the role they play.”118
• “Communications staff . . . tend to just boil a complicated sub-
ject down to two or three sentences at most, to get that out to the
public.”119
• “Communications is geared toward speaking to an audience of
non-experts.”120
114 For the applicable House rule, see COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT,
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 121–42 (2008), https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/
documents/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BGL-5RKF].
115 Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
116 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
117 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
118 Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
119 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
120 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 5,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“[Their job is to] cut to the core essence of an issue to commu-
nicate it to a layman who might not know anything about a given issue.”); Interview with No.
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Moreover, Member communications staff also must shape these com-
munications for an audience with a specific set of parochial concerns. As a
result, their communications are expected to be framed specifically to appeal
to constituents residing in the state or district of the Member. As one inter-
viewee put it, Member communications staff “is focused on making sure
that they can communicate the goals and ideas of the Member to the
constituency.”121
Additionally, Member communications staff are expected to shape
communications in a way that takes advantage of the current media ecosys-
tem. They are supposed to possess in-depth knowledge about the media out-
lets that function as intermediaries between the Member and his or her
constituency. Commenting on this element of the position, interviewees
observed:
• “The communications department’s . . . expertise is in the media
and in speaking to a mass audience.”122
• “Communications staff tend to be very media focused, more
soundbites and tweets.”123
• “They have their finger on the pulse of [how] the media works
and how best to get the message out.”124
In part, this element of the job requires an expertise in traditional media,
such as newspapers and television. As interviewees remarked:
• “So much of their role is managing relations with reporters.”125
• “I don’t even know what they do all day every day except talk
to reporters.”126
• “That’s where the ‘comms’ people come in—they’ve got to go
sell it to the reporters, sell it to the press.”127
• “Anything blasted out as a press statement or a press release . . .
that’s where the communications team tends to come in.”128
1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“They
have to try to channel complex policy issues into understandable forms for people.”); Inter-
view with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
121 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 18,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
122 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
123 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
124 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also id. (“[Member communi-
cations staff understands how] the media works and how best to get the message out.”).
125 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
126 Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
127 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
128 Interview with No. 5., Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 15,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Our communications director does a lot of the strategic com-
munications—like [deciding] what Op-Ed on what topic in what national paper. . . . And then
we have a press secretary who’s much more focused on the day-to-day of making sure our
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Member communications staffers also bring an expertise in navigating
the modern media landscape—including internet and social media outlets
(such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter). On this point, interviewees
remarked:
• “In [2018, Member communications staff] have distribution
channels to take what is spoken on the floor and distribute it out
to mass numbers of people. Even if the media isn’t interested in
something that goes on there, we can take the video, we can
post it on Facebook, we can post it on Twitter, and we can reach
nearly a mass audience that way.”129
• “We have a press secretary who’s much more focused on the
day-to-day of . . . making sure we have three tweets a day, or
whatever Facebook post needs to go up.”130
• “They will record what the Member is doing . . . and then put
that out on social media.”131
• “Pretty much anything that lives online [is the purview of
Member communications staffers.]”132
• “[Member] communications staff repackage [some state-
ments] into press releases, newsletters—and, with the advent of
social media, as videos to push out to any Member’s social me-
dia following.”133
What does it mean, then, for Member communications staffers to have
an expertise in crafting statements for media outlets, whether traditional or
new media? In part, it means that they are expected to use tactics of persua-
sion that, over the past half-century, have developed in the modern media
context. Colloquially, these tactics often are referred to as “messaging” or
“spin.”134 One interviewee offered an illuminative analogy about the nature
of these tactics: if legislative staff are the engineers of Congress—the indi-
viduals who design and structure policies—then communications staff are
the car salesmen of Congress.135
press releases go out on our bills.”); Interview with No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
(“Their focus is working with the press, getting stories out, getting our message out.”).
129 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
130 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
131 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
132 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
133 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 12,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
134 For references to this work as “messaging,” see Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 24, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. On “spin,” see Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
135 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\hll102.txt unknown Seq: 30  6-JAN-20 14:57
120 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
Other interviewees reinforced this observation about the marketing-ori-
ented nature of this staffer position. To this end, interviewees offered the
following comments:
• “Press is a combination of writing and telemarketing.”136
• “[The communications director will] make sure everything is
in harmony with what our larger . . . branding goals are with
[the Member].”137
• “They have to sell it.”138
• “The legislative people don’t know how to take all that minutiae
that they do . . . and turn it into a sellable message.”139
• “Their role is descriptive storytelling.”140
2. Portfolio / Specialization
Unlike legislative staffers, Member communications staffers do not
specialize by policy area. Instead, a Member communications staffer is ex-
pected to generate communications with respect to the full range of policy
topics that arise in Congress. Consequently, among the sixteen interviewees
who mentioned the issue of specialization with respect to Member commu-
nications staffers, all sixteen reported that member communications staffers
handle a broader policy portfolio than do their peers. As one interviewee
remarked about Member communications staffers: “They need to be able to
talk about everything.”141
Some Member communications staffs—especially in the House—could
not specialize by policy area even if they desired to do so, simply because
the Member employs only a single communications staffer.142 Even when a
Member does retain a communications department consisting of multiple
staffers, the department will specialize along some axis other than policy
area. Interviewees reported a variety of axes that are used for this purpose,
including: (1) digital versus traditional media;143 (2) senior versus junior
staff;144 (3) long-term strategy planning versus daily messaging;145 (4) divi-
136 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
137 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
138 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
139 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
140 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 24,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Their focus . . . [is on] making sure that we stay on-message,
are developing whatever that message may be, and push that message forward.”); Interview
with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Communications people . . . know how to spin
that [legislative information].”).
141 Interview with No. 18, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
142 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
143 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (suggesting that every communications office now has a separate posi-
tion of digital director).
144 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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sion by task;146 and (5) division by region.147 Even when afforded the oppor-
tunity to specialize, therefore, Member communications staffs do not elect to
divide work portfolios by policy area.
3. Policy Expertise
Member communications staff possess less policy expertise than do
their peers on legislative staffs. Sixteen interviewees mentioned the issue of
policy expertise in the context of Member communications staff; of these, all
sixteen advanced the claim that Member communications staff bring a lower
level of policy expertise than do Member legislative staffs. As one inter-
viewee put it in response to a question about why the former might not draft
certain types of statements: “In the personal office [communications depart-
ments], I just don’t think that expertise is there for them to be able to do
it.”148
This lack of policy expertise is partly attributable, once again, to the
concomitant lack of policy-area specialization. Remarking on this connec-
tion, interviewees commented:
• “Communications staff are doing everything. They’re seeing all
kinds of things. And they’re learning just enough to be able to
explain it to the outside world.”149
• “They know a good bit about the policy, but not the details—as
you’d expect, [given that they’re working] across all the issue
areas.”150
• “A personal office [communications staffer] that has to do
every single issue that we may vote on at any point during the
year or Congress—they don’t have the ability to go too deep.”151
The lack of policy expertise among Member communications staff also
is attributable to hiring and staffing practices. Rather than hire individuals
with backgrounds in policy work, many Member offices hire communica-
tions staffers who bring backgrounds in journalism or public relations.152
Member offices also will hire communications staffers with experience do-
ing media work on campaigns—a hiring practice that, according to one in-
terviewee, means that: “Usually, around cycle, you’ll see all of them cycle
145 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
146 Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
147 Id.
148 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
149 Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
150 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
151 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 6,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (applying the “mile-wide, foot-deep” description to communica-
tions staffers, relative to their legislative peers); Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
152 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 3, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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off the Hill and go off to campaigns, and then cycle back on.”153 Other
Member offices believe that it makes sense either to hire without regard to
prior experience, particularly for lower-level communications positions,154 or
to view prior work in a congressional communications department as the
only relevant experience.155 In any case, the result is that: “Generally speak-
ing, ‘comms’ staff don’t come from the policy background that the legislative
staff has.”156
4. Knowledge of Bill
Member communications staff do not personally develop individual
bills, nor do they review the text of these bills. As Part III.A explained, this
was a widely-shared assumption among interviewees. Moreover, among the
small number of interviewees who did explicitly draw comparisons of the
knowledge of bills across staffer types, it was unanimous that Member com-
munications staffers had less knowledge of, and exposure to, individual bills
than did their congressional peers. With respect to bill drafting, for example,
an interviewee noted: “The ‘comms’ staff have no role in drafting legisla-
tion.”157 Instead, interviewees explained, Member communications staff are
wholly reliant upon Member legislative staff for their knowledge of bill con-
tents.158 As a result, their knowledge of bills is more superficial than that of
Member legislative staff.
5. Intended Audience
Member communications staff are focused upon reaching an audience
of generalist voters—in particular, those who reside in the Member’s home
state or district.159 As explained above, this also includes a focus on the me-
153 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 3,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
154 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
155 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
156 Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
157 Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
158 See, e.g., Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 2,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
159 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 5, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; see also supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text.
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dia outlets that act as intermediaries between the Member and those general-
ist voters.160
The targeting of constituents as an intended audience—and of the me-
dia outlets that reach them—has important implications for the reliability of
the resulting congressional statements. It provides a reason to believe that
statements drafted by Member communications staff are, all else equal, less
faithful to the underlying legal texts they are describing than are statements
drafted by staffers who target legal audiences. This conclusion is based on
two elements that, according to interviewees, are integral to the way that
statements are tailored to constituents in Congress.
First, it is assumed that constituents lack either the capacity, or else the
attention span, to absorb many technical details. In exchange for brevity and
accessibility, therefore, drafters of constituent-targeted statements will sacri-
fice something else: precision and detail. Fourteen different interviewees
mentioned this reduction of precision and detail as part of the process of
tailoring statements for constituents. As interviewees put it:
• “You’re sacrificing some details to make it easy to
understand.”161
• “It’s our job [as Member legislative staffers] to know the tech-
nicalities and nuances, and it’s their job [as Member communi-
cations staffers] to dumb that down.”162
Put differently, it is thought that any statement for a constituent “needs
to be in plain English”163 and “in layman’s terms”164 as various interviewees
put it—and this involves stripping statements of nuance and detail. Unfortu-
nately, an elimination of nuance and detail often is also an elimination of
accuracy. For this reason, the re-framing of legislative ideas for constituents
is a process that likely reduces the accuracy of the resulting statement.
Second, as interviewees explained, Member communications staffers
pursue a particular goal in their communications with constituents: the goal
of persuasion. As one interviewee put it: “You’re trying to be persuasive for
whoever may be watching.”165 Fourteen interviewees mentioned this goal as
something that congressional staffers seek when communicating with con-
stituents. This differs from the goal that interviewees articulated with respect
160 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 6, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; see also supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text. R
161 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
162 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C; see also Interview with No. 16,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“[The Member communications staffer] will tweak [state-
ments] for—usually, to make them less wonky, or make them more easy to understand.”).
163 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
164 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
165 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 7,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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to legal audiences, where they asserted that they were attempting to accu-
rately relay their intent, not to persuade on any specific points.
Why, from an accuracy or reliability standpoint, is this shift to persua-
sion troubling? In describing the nature of the persuasive rhetoric that staff-
ers insert for constituents, interviewees pointed toward the tactics of
persuasion that have developed in the modern media and marketing contexts.
These tactics borrow from the types of puffery and persuasion to which
modern Americans have become acclimated in the commercial space. Ges-
turing toward this connection, numerous interviewees analogized their me-
dia-targeted and constituent-targeted rhetoric to the rhetoric of advertising
and commercial sales.166 As students of commercial transactions have long
realized, these “puffery” tactics are prone to exaggeration. The use of these
tactics in constituent-targeted communications, therefore, is a second ele-
ment that regularly decreases the accuracy of these particular
communications.
Indeed, several interviewees described a somewhat troubling dynamic
within Member offices—one wherein Member legislative staff are required
to fight for the accuracy of statements against the competing efforts at acces-
sibility and persuasiveness by Member communications staff. As one inter-
viewee remarked:
There are many times spats between our [legislative] office and
our press office. They’ll put something in, and we’re like, ‘No, you
can’t say that, that’s not technically accurate.’ And then they’ll
come back and say, ‘Well so what?’ And we’re like, “Nope,” and
we’ll cross it out. And then we’ll have to go through several rounds
of iterations on a press release because we as policymakers get
really offended by—I hate inaccuracies. And they’re trying to say
[a bill helps a population that it doesn’t help]. And it’s just like,
‘No, this bill has nothing to do with [that population or program].
Strike that word.’ So it’s those kinds of things—‘Well no, that’s not
accurate,’ and then we’ll have a conversation, go back and forth,
they become much more accurate, so they are much more reflec-
tive of the intent of the bill.167
Interviewees contended that, when this contentious staffer dialogue op-
erates properly, it can generate Member statements that contain the best of
166 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
167 Interview with No. 19., Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C; see also Interview with No. 23,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Communications staff are always rolling their eyes [at Mem-
ber legislative staff,] and are like, ‘They don’t even talk in English. Nobody knows what
they’re saying, and no one cares.’ And policy staff are always like, ‘You really cannot say that.
You can’t say that. It’s not even a little bit true. It’s not even a little bit true, and you can’t say
it.’ And they’re like, ‘But it is! These two things are the same thing.’ And you’re like, ‘These
two things aren’t the same thing.’ So, there is this fundamental [divide].”).
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both worlds—which is to say, that are both persuasive and accurate. None-
theless, these hypothetical staffer dialogues underscore the ways in which
Member communications staffers, due to their focus on constituent persua-
sion, inject a voice into congressional decisions that does not prioritize accu-
racy. In so doing, these dialogues paint a troubling picture of the impact that
Member communications staffers may have on the legal precision and accu-
racy of congressional statements.
To this end, staff within Congress will view the accuracy of a statement
as tied, in significant part, to the level of participation that communications
staff has in its drafting. This was underscored by one interviewee who sug-
gested that even a press release from a committee will be more accurate than
a floor statement from an off-committee Member of Congress.168 Explaining
the reason for this assessment, the interviewee remarked:
I can definitively say that the accuracy of what we put out is
higher and truer to the intent of a bill than it would be in a personal
office. [I say this because] my understanding, at least anecdotally
. . . is their press team will more often roll them, than the other
way around. On our committee, it’s not like that.169
Under this account, once again, the robust involvement of communications
staff is linked to a corresponding decrease in the accuracy of a document or
statement.
IV. DRAFTING ASSIGNMENTS FOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In the interviews for this Article, interviewees also were asked: which
type of staffer is assigned to draft each type of legislative history? In re-
sponse, interviewees described a universe of drafting assignments that is de-
picted in Figure 3, below.
168 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
169 Id.
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Figure 3. Drafters Overview.
The remainder of this Part will be devoted to discussing the details of
the data captured in Figure 3. To this end, each Subpart will begin with
additional Figures that highlight a particular subset of Figure 3, and that add
detail to it.
A. Committee Reports






















Committee Reports: Specific Drafter
Figures 4 & 5. Committee Report Drafters.
Figure 4 shows that, according to interviewees, committee reports are
the purview of committee staff. Member staff generally do not have any
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involvement in the drafting of these reports—an assessment that all thirty
interviewees corroborated. As one interviewee said in a representative re-
mark: “I can’t think of an instance where a Member’s office staff has done a
committee report.”170 Another added: “The [Member’s] personal staff don’t
have any real role. And the personal staff of a Member . . . who may be the
sponsor of a bill have no real role.”171
Meanwhile, Figure 5 reveals that—within the committee—it is the
committee legislative staff that takes responsibility for drafting these reports
(in association with committee counsels, who similarly can be considered
committee legislative staff).172 Twenty-six interviewees corroborated this as-
sessment, while none contradicted it. As one interviewee put it: “It is usually
the lead staffer who was on that policy [who] writes the summaries up and
things like that and is responsible for compiling all the various pieces.”173
The committee legislative staffer who drafts the committee report is, in
typical cases, the same staffer who developed the underlying bill. Thirteen
interviewees mentioned this element of the drafting assignment. As one in-
terviewee put it:
The people . . . I knew of drafting committee reports had either
worked very closely with Leg Counsel [i.e., the Office of the Leg-
islative Counsel, which drafts bill text], or had sent a first draft to
Leg Counsel. I don’t know of anybody who took a first pen on a
committee report who was given the task fairly cold. It was usu-
ally either one of the negotiators or one of the drafters who took
the first pen on that. Now, lots of other people might be engaged to
give review and feedback. But they were pretty tightly
connected.174
This description of drafting assignments assumes, of course, that bills
are being developed (or at least significantly refined) at the committee level,
as opposed to the Member-office level. This will not be true in all cases,
although interviewees provided some reason to think that it is true more
often than prevailing thought might suggest.175 Describing the perceived link
between these two activities (viz., report writing and development of the
underlying bill), one staffer mentioned that: “The public documents [are
170 Interview with No. 4, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
171 Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
172 See, e.g., Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (explaining that “coun-
sel” was simply a way to acknowledge a staffer’s law degree, not a marker of a distinct role).
173 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
174 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
175 See, e.g., Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (explaining that com-
mittee staffs sometimes will develop bills and then distribute them to Member offices); Inter-
view with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (estimating that more bills moving forward in
the legislative process are committee-initiated than Member-initiated).
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viewed as] an adjunct to legislation,” and so it makes sense to have the
same institutional actor handle them both.176
As interviewees did note, there are a few caveats to this drafting assign-
ment. First, a few portions of committee reports are drafted by, or with
heavy assistance from, the nonpartisan offices within Congress. In the
House, the Office of the Legislative Counsel will prepare the “Changes in
Existing Law” provision of the report, for example.177 The Congressional
Budget Office will prepare the provision titled “Cost Estimate Prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office,” of course.178 And the Congressional Re-
search Service will provide materials, such as descriptions of current law,
that committee legislative staffers may use when drafting the various back-
ground, summary, and explanation provisions of committee reports—or that
these staffers may even insert directly into reports.179 Also, if an individual
Member inserts an additional view into the report in his or her own name,
the personal staff of the Member may handle the drafting of that provision.180
Notwithstanding these contributions, however, committee reports are
noteworthy for the extent to which they are considered the sole purview of
committee legislative staff. As Parts IV.B through IV.D will explain, while
most types of legislative history are assigned to a lead drafter, they nonethe-
less tend to be collaborative products. By contrast, nine different interview-
ees underscored that the committee report is generated solely by committee
legislative staff. As one committee legislative staffer put it: “[The commit-
tee reports are] wholly within our responsibility.”181 Underscoring the sig-
nificance of this fact, an interviewee referred to it as marking the
“fundamental difference” between committee reports and statements by a
committee chair or ranking Member.182
Interviewees also explained the process by which committee legislative
staff draft these reports. When drafting them, interviewees said, they often
will draw upon summary documents for a bill that are prepared by commit-
tee staff earlier in the committee process.183 The most notable such document
176 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
177 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. On the Senate side, committees may be expected to
develop this provision internally. This section is known within Congress as the “Ramseyer
report.” See DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-661, at 3144 (1994).
178 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
179 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 15, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
180 Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 2,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (identifying isolated instances in which staff of a particularly
involved Member may contribute advice).
181 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
182 Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
183 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 21, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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is the hearing memorandum.184 To the extent that it is publicly available,
therefore, statutory interpreters may want to consider reviewing hearing
memoranda, since committee legislative staffers themselves view these as
useful summaries. These memoranda may exist only for bills that proceed
through the traditional committee development process, however.
Once the various pieces of the committee report are drafted, those
pieces will be compiled and assembled into a formatted report (typically in
accordance with a committee-held template).185 This assembling work can be
performed by a committee clerk, a committee parliamentarian, the commit-
tee legislative staffer tasked with drafting the report, or the committee coun-
sel.186 The report then is subjected to at least one level of review, wherein it
is reviewed by a superior on committee staff—typically, by a staff director
or a chief counsel (or both).187
In addition to this review by majority staff, committee reports also reg-
ularly undergo a second (and particularly noteworthy) type of review prior to
publication: namely, review by committee legislative staff for the minority
party. Fifteen interviewees mentioned that committee reports undergo this
particular form of minority-party review. Interviewees suggested that this is
a uniform practice when the report is bipartisan (i.e., when the minority
party does not file separate dissenting views), and even when the report is
partisan but the underlying issue was not politically divisive. Interviewees
offered contrasting assessments on whether this practice was followed even
with regard to partisan reports on politically divisive bills; on some commit-
tees, however, it plainly is followed even in this situation.188 In the case that
minority views are filed, moreover, the same process might occur in reverse;
the majority is given the opportunity to review the report in advance of filing
or publication, thereby allowing Members the chance to file additional views
that rebut any inaccuracies discovered in the minority views.189 In fact, some
184 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 21, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
185 See, e.g., Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
186 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 12, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
187 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
188 Compare Interview with No. 4, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C. (asserting that it is uniformly followed) with Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (asserting that it may not be
uniformly followed, at least for some report provisions).
189 See, e.g., Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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committees have entrenched this practice of opposing-party review by writ-
ing it into their committee rules.190
Part VI will discuss the importance of this opposing-party review prac-
tice in further detail. Nonetheless, it is worth briefly noting its significance.
Much of the scholarly debate over committee reports has centered around
the concern that, because committee reports may not be reviewed by Mem-
bers of Congress, these reports therefore might present a dangerous opportu-
nity for unprincipled congressional staffers, acting outside of any external
review, to insert misleading material into reports.191 As the opposing-party
review practice reveals, however, a lack of Member review does not mean
that no effective mechanisms exist to ensure that staffers generate accurate
committee reports. Instead, it reveals, committees have adopted an alterna-
tive mechanism that serves this function. And, indeed, interviewees did note
that they view opposing-party review as serving the function of promoting
accountability and accuracy. Explaining the nature of this review, for exam-
ple, one interviewee noted: “You’re just reading it to make sure they’re not
editorializing too much, or [inserting] something that you disagree with.”192
Similarly, when asked what (if anything) prevents nefarious insertion of ma-
terial by staffers, an interviewee responded: “I think the bipartisan review is
really helpful.”193 Another remarked: “There’s always the minority—the
other side is a check.”194
190 See, e.g., U.S. SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, & FORESTRY, COMMITTEE
RULES: RULES OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, & FORESTRY, Rule 2.3 (“An
appropriate opportunity shall be given the Minority to examine the proposed text of committee
reports prior to their filing or publication. In the event there are supplemental, minority, or
additional views, an appropriate opportunity shall be given the Majority to examine the pro-
posed text prior to filing or publication.”), http://www.agriculture.senate.gov/about/commit-
tee-rules [https://perma.cc/KS6C-TAT5]; U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION,
LABOR, & PENSIONS, 111TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON HEALTH,
EDUCATION, LABOR, & PENSIONS (Comm. Print 2010) (“An appropriate opportunity shall be
given the minority to examine the proposed text of committee reports prior to their filing or
publication. In the event there are supplemental, minority, or additional views, an appropriate
opportunity shall be given the majority to examine the proposed text prior to filing or
publication.”).
191 For this scholarship, see infra Part VI.B.2.
192 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
193 Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
194 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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Chair & Ranking Member Statements: Specific Drafter
Committee Legislative Staff
Committee Legislative Staff (w/ edits by Ctte Communications Staff and/or Member Staff)
Committee Legislative Staff & Committee Communications Staff
Committee Leg & Comms Staff and Member Leg & Comms Staff
Member Legislative Staff
Member Communications Staff
Figures 6 & 7. Chair & Ranking Member Statement Drafters.
Drafting assignments for Member statements are divided along an axis
that is not reflected in current scholarship. According to this division, state-
ments are handled differently—i.e., are drafted by different staff—when
they both: (1) are to be spoken by the Chair or Ranking Member of a com-
mittee or subcommittee, and (2) address a topic within the jurisdiction of
that committee or subcommittee. This is true, interviewees explained, re-
gardless of whether the statement is to be issued in a hearing, in a markup, or
on the chamber floor. In each instance, the statement is produced by the
same set of distinctive actors.
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As Figure 6 reveals, these Chair or Ranking Member statements typi-
cally are drafted by committee staff, not by Member staff. When asked to
identify the actors who draft these statements, twenty-three interviewees
pointed to committee staff; by contrast, only one interviewee suggested that
these statements are co-drafted by committee staff and Member staff, while
zero interviewees claimed that these statements are generated solely by
Member staff. These results illustrate that, while Member staff may periodi-
cally be consulted about the content of these statements, the statements typi-
cally are the work product of committee staff.
As Figure 7 then illustrates, interviewees were unambiguous about the
involvement, specifically, of committee legislative staff in the drafting pro-
cess for these statements. Interviewee answers varied, meanwhile, regarding
which additional actors may also contribute input. Six interviewees asserted
that committee legislative staff have sole responsibility for drafting these
statements; meanwhile, thirteen interviewees said that committee legislative
staff drafts these statements, but with edits from other staffs (which could
consist of Member legislative staffs, Member communications staffs—or, an
actor not yet discussed, the committee communications staffs). Three inter-
viewees also contended that committee legislative staffs and committee
communications staffs draft these statements collaboratively, and one inter-
viewee said that all aforementioned staffs will draft the statements
collaboratively.
Interviewees typically described a situation, therefore, in which com-
mittee legislative staff would draft an initial statement, and in which the
other relevant actors would review and edit it. In a representative statement,
one interviewee said:
We have an approval process. The professional staffer who han-
dles the issue takes the first cut at the opening statement, and then
it moves through our subcommittee—and that’s typically just get-
ting refined, it’s nothing significant . . . and then it goes to our
senior staff—and our senior staff includes the communications
team, and our staff director, and our counsel has to see it—it’s
seeing a lot of eyes. Once that gets approved, it goes to the per-
sonal office of the chairman, because they need to make sure
there’s nothing in there that could be politically dangerous for his
local politics. Again, nine times out of ten, that’s coming back un-
touched from the personal office. But there are things that we don’t
understand about the local politics that sometimes we’ll go back
and forth on. . . . So, it’s much more of a policy metric until it
reaches the personal office, and then there’s a political component,
and then it comes back to us.195
195 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 8,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“The floor statements [for the Chair or Ranking Member]
would often be, as a first draft, done by the person closest to [the bill and the issue], but then
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While not uniform, descriptions of this sort of collaboration—where com-
mittee legislative staff take primary drafting responsibility—were
prevailing.
The resulting picture is one in which committee legislative staff drive
the drafting process for Chair and Ranking Member statements—but in
which these actors, when drafting these statements, are collaborating some-
what with various other congressional staffers. This collaborative element
distinguishes these statements from committee reports, which (as discussed
above) are the sole purview of committee staff. As one interviewee put it:
“[The] big difference is that, [when drafting Chair or Ranking Member
statements], we also have to get involved with the personal office staffs.”196
Interviewees also suggested that, typically, the committee legislative
staffer assigned to draft the Chair or Ranking Member statements was the
same staffer who developed the underlying bill. Unlike with committee re-
ports, however, they suggested that there occasionally would be some devia-
tion from this typical assignment process.197
While committee communications staffs are not significant drafters of
legislative history, and therefore did not warrant separate treatment in this
Article, their brief appearance here warrants comment. According to inter-
viewees, these actors strongly resemble the Member communications staff-
ers—their job description, in the words of one interviewee, is that: “They
have to help the Chairman sell what we’re putting forth.”198 In comparison,
however, the committee communications staffer is more specialized than is
the Member communications staffer (because working on a committee with
narrowed jurisdiction), and may consequently possess slightly more policy
expertise.199
circulated amongst upper staff, leadership, and ‘comms’ for feedback. And they would flag
different issues. So, they would be involved.”).
196 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
197 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 17, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
198 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
199 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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Hearing & Markup Statements: Specific Drafters
Committee Legislative Staff
Committee Legislative Staff & Member Legislative Staff
Member Legislative Staff
Member Legislative Staff (w/ edits from Committee Staff and/or Member Communications Staff)
Member Legislative Staff & Communications Staff
Member Communications Staff
Figures 8 & 9. Other Hearing & Markup Statement Drafters.
When a hearing or markup statement will be issued by a Member of
Congress other than a relevant Chair or Ranking Member, as Figure 8
shows, it is generated by Member staff, not by committee staff. Twenty-four
interviewees asserted that drafting responsibility for these statements be-
longs solely to Member staff, while only two interviewees suggested that
Member office staff and committee staff regularly collaborate on such state-
ments, and zero interviewees asserted that committee staff alone handles
these statements. As one interviewee explained: “If the Member is not the
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ranker or not the chairman, then usually their personal office staff write the
statement.”200
Interviewees did offer three minor caveats on this point. First, they
noted that committee staff often will develop a “bank” of questions for hear-
ings, or a similar “bank” of talking points for some markups, that Member
staff may draw upon for assistance.201 Second, if Member staff specifically
requests assistance in the drafting process, committee staff may provide that
assistance, time permitting.202 Third, committee staff may review Member
statements or questions to prevent redundancy across Members.203 Interview-
ees did not view these practices as significant, however, as Figure 8 shows.
Within the Member office, meanwhile, Member legislative staff take a
primary drafting role for hearing and markup statements, either alone or with
edits from other staffs. Specifically, seven interviewees mentioned only
Member legislative staff as the drafters of these statements, while eight in-
terviewees similarly identified Member legislative staff as the drafters but
noted that other staffs took an editing role, and two interviewees pointed
toward both Member legislative staff and Member communications staff as
collaborative partners in the drafting of these statements. Meanwhile, only
one interviewee identified Member communications staff as the sole drafter
of these statements. As an interviewee said in a typical response:
• “Their [Member legislative] staffer who handles the committee
will take the first cut, and then their press team, communica-
tions director will take a look. . . . [Then these initial drafters]
probably have to go through their Legislative Director, then
their Chief of Staff, and then the Member probably.”204
• “The ‘leg’ staffers are the ones who do most of the drafting. . . .
What [Member communications staff] will tweak is style, and
voice, and tenor, and things like that.”205
Interviewees additionally gave mixed responses regarding whether,
when Member staff had developed a bill (as opposed to committee staff), the
200 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
201 Id.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
202 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
203 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
204 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
205 Interview with No. 27, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 3,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“Typically, it’s policy [staff] first, communications [staff]
second, chief of staff or principal [reviewing] third . . . and then back down the chain.”).
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Member legislative staffer assigned to draft the hearing or markup statement
would be the same staffer who developed the underlying bill. Five interview-
ees affirmed that it likely would be the same individual, whereas two inter-
viewees suggested that it was not a high priority to align these two drafting
assignments.




















Floor Statements: Specific Drafter
Committee Legislative Staff
Member Legislative Staff
Member Legislative Staff (w/ edits by Member Communications Staff)
Member Legislative Staff & Member Communications Staff
Member Communications Staff (w/ edits from Member Legislative Staff)
Member Communications Staff
Figures 10 & 11. Other Floor Statement Drafters.
Floor statements for a bill, when not for a Chair or Ranking Member
discussed in Part IV.B, are produced by Member office staff. As Figure 10
illustrates, committee staff typically are not involved in the drafting of these
statements. To this end, twenty-seven interviewees asserted that Member of-
fice staff generate these floor statements, while zero interviewees asserted
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that committee staff draft these statements (whether alone or in collaboration
with Member staff). In the words of one interviewee, floor statements are
“entirely personal staff.”206
Interviewees did identify two caveats to this claim—caveats already
discussed in the context of hearings and markups. First, committee staff
sometimes will develop talking points to distribute to Members on the floor
who are seeking additional material for remarks.207 Second, committee staff
sometimes will assist with or review Member statements upon request, time
permitting.208 As Figure 10 shows, however, interviewees nonetheless
viewed Member office staff as the drafters of floor statements.
Within the Member office staff, meanwhile, these floor statements typi-
cally are the result of a collaboration between Member legislative staff and
Member communications staff. As Figure 11 illustrates, eight interviewees
posited that floor statements emerge from this collaboration—and eight ad-
ditional interviewees asserted that, while Member legislative staff drafts the
initial version of the statement, Member communications staff then edits or
contributes to it. By contrast, only two interviewees said that floor state-
ments are handled simply by Member communications staff, and only one
interviewee said that these statements are drafted simply by Member legisla-
tive staff. As interviewees put it:
• “Generally, the ‘leg’ staff, in coordination with the communica-
tions staff, will want to work on that product, so that it has both
pieces to it—both the policy side of it and the messaging side of
it.”209
• “If it’s on the floor, whoever drafts first, there’s almost always
going to be very close involvement between the relevant legisla-
tive staffer and the communications department.”210
This collaborative element is reminiscent of hearing and markup state-
ments by “down-dais” Members of Congress, which, as Part IV.C ex-
plained, also frequently result from a collaboration between Member
legislative staff and Member communications staff. However, interviewees
underscored that, when this collaboration occurs in the context of a floor
statement, Member communications staff takes a more prominent drafting
role. Indeed, interviewees explained, Member communications staff some-
times displace Member legislative staff as the primary drafters for floor
statements. One interviewee, for example, noted that: “Our hearing remarks
206 Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 11,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
207 Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also supra note 201 and
accompanying text.
208 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also supra
note 203 and accompanying text.
209 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
210 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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tend to originate with our policy staff, and then our floor remarks tend to
originate with our communications staff.”211 Interviewees were not uniform
in suggesting that Member communications staffs originate these statements,
as Figure 11 shows. Yet they did suggest that this occurs with greater regu-
larity in the context of floor statements. Moreover, this trend illustrates the
broader point that many interviewees underscored in conversation: namely,
that Member communications staff share a greater responsibility for floor
statements than they do for markup and hearing statements.212
Interviewees gave mixed reports on whether the staffer who drafts the
floor statement will be the same staffer who develops the underlying bill.
Among the interviewees who addressed this point, five again suggested that
it might indeed be the same individual, whereas two said that it typically
would not be the same individual.
Two trends in drafting assignments, moreover, provide reasons to doubt
that these floor statements are drafted by the same staffer who developed the
underlying bill. First, Member communications staffs do not develop bills in
Congress, and so their increased drafting role inevitably entails a shift of
drafting responsibility away from individuals who might have worked to
develop the bill. Second, Member office staffs draft statements for the Mem-
ber of Congress who employs them—not for other Members. Therefore,
even if a Member office regularly assigns drafting responsibility for a floor
statement to the staffer who developed the underlying bill, that will align bill
development and drafting assignment only within the office of the bill spon-
sor—and only if the bill was developed at the Member level, not the com-
mittee level (or leadership level). However, some interviewees suggested
that committees remain the locus of bill development—one interviewee even
noted that committees regularly will develop bills and distribute them to
Members to create the useful illusion of Member productivity.213 By con-
trast, committee legislative staff are more likely to be involved with bill
development for each bill that moves through their committees. As one in-
terviewee put it: “[If the bill was passed out of committee,] I’ve had my
hands on it.”214 Together, these two observations suggest that these floor
statements often are assigned to a staffer who did not develop the underlying
bill.215
211 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 28,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
212 See, e.g., Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (explaining that messag-
ing-oriented Members shift primary drafting responsibility to communications staff); Interview
with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (explaining why the difference in audience leads to a
greater role for communications staff); Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
(explaining same).
213 Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (on the distribution of committee-
developed bills to Members).
214 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
215 The latter observation also applies to hearing and markup statements, of course.
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E. The Scripted Nature of Congressional Statements
Stepping back from the details of these drafting assignments, they high-
light a broader observation about the modern Congress: today, statements by
Members typically are scripted in advance. Admittedly, spontaneous utter-
ances by Members are not extinct in Congress; interviewees noted isolated
instances in which these still occur.216 Nonetheless, interviewees emphasized
that such moments have become exceedingly rare.
This scripted quality may be particularly surprising with respect to
statements made at the committee level, since hearings and markups are
presented to the public as efforts at congressional fact-finding. Yet inter-
viewees repeatedly emphasized the statements’ scripted nature. As they put
it:
• “In my opinion, markups, like hearings, are Kabuki theatre.
That’s how most staffers feel about them.”217
• “[Markups] are carefully orchestrated and scripted behind the
scenes.”218
• “When I first came to the Hill, I was a little surprised, I thought,
‘oh, these are often educational things, where Members can
learn about a topic.’ And sometimes it certainly is that. But more
often than not . . . it’s all—I wouldn’t say tightly scripted, but it’s
all very well thought out and planned, at least with a plan that
you try to execute.”219
In this regard, the interviews for this article chronicle an important
change. A century ago, Woodrow Wilson famously remarked that: “Con-
gress in its committee rooms is Congress at work.”220 Today, by contrast, the
scripted nature of markups has created a situation in which, in the words of
one interviewee: “Markups . . . [are] not where the real work is done.”221
Floor speeches, interviewees noted, similarly are scripted and planned
in advance—even in colloquies, which are drafted to create the appearance
of a spontaneous exchange. As an interviewee put it: “A colloquy is always
scripted. . . . Every letter is negotiated.”222
216 See, e.g., Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
217 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
218 Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
219 Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 2,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 12, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash.,
D.C.; Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“I’ll be honest—
we cook our markups. They are scripted.”).
220
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 79 (15th ed. 1913) (1885).
221 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
222 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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V. LOGIC OF DRAFTING ASSIGNMENTS: INTENDED AUDIENCE
Why does Congress divide drafting responsibility for legislative history
among different institutional actors, as described in Part IV? Returning to
the theory of congressional motivations articulated in Part II can help answer
this question. According to that theory, Members of Congress are driven by
at least two ambitions: (1) implementing policy objectives; and (2) getting
reelected. Realizing each ambition requires effective communication with a
different intended audience. The first goal—implementing policy objec-
tives—requires effective communication with policy implementers (includ-
ing courts, agencies, and perhaps even future Congresses). The second
ambition, meanwhile, requires persuasive communication with constituents.
When crafting a statement, therefore, Members of Congress will ask: what is
the likelihood that the statement will reach, and will be persuasive with, each
of these audiences? The answer to this question (i.e., the question of who the
Member views as a realistic intended audience for a statement) then will
drive the drafting assignment for that statement—since Members retain
staffs that, in different measure, are expert at communicating with each of
these audiences.
To reveal this alignment of drafting assignment with intended audience,
interviewees were asked to identify, for each type of legislative history, the
intended audience that they were targeting with the communication. In re-
sponse, interviewees provided the data about intended audiences that is cap-








Committee Reports Hearing & Markup Statements Floor Statements
Courts & Agencies History & Future Congresses Constituents & Public
Congressional Colleagues Interest Groups
Figure 12. Intended Audiences for Legislative History.
The remainder of this Part will be devoted to discussing the details of
the data captured in Figure 12, as well as the information provided by inter-
viewees in follow-up questions.
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Figure 13. Intended Audiences for Committee Reports.
Figure 13 depicts interviewee responses regarding the intended audi-
ence for committee reports. As this Figure shows, interviewees pointed to
policy implementers as the primary intended audience for these reports. This
audience consists of two subsets: the courts (which ten interviewees identi-
fied as the intended audience) and executive agencies (which another ten
interviewees mentioned). As one interviewee put it: “I think of the commit-
tee report as being for people who are actually implementing the law. I want
to be sure that I’m clear about what I meant to do.”223 Another added: “Com-
mittee reports seem to be more for the courts or the agencies. So, whoever
would be implementing a bill after it was enacted—making sure that the
stuff that was behind the negotiated result that would inform the imple-
menter, making sure that that was recorded somewhere.”224
A significant number of interviewees also identified another intended
audience for committee reports: history and future Congresses. Nine differ-
ent interviewees mentioned this audience. Speaking to the historical compo-
nent of this, one interviewee said: “The committee report is for historians.
It’s more like a record of why we did what we did.”225 Similarly, another
interviewee added: “The committee report, I view mostly as a historical doc-
ument that is intended to cover the views of the time of passage, to develop
more of a historical document, so that somebody five years from now or ten
223 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
224 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
225 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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years from now can say what was happening when people were passing this
bill.”226
Interestingly, a number of interviewees not only asserted that they write
committee reports with future congresses in mind as an intended audience;
they said that they also read committee reports in order to gain a better un-
derstanding of legislation by past congresses.227 This usage would seem to
suggest that, within Congress, staffers themselves view committee reports as
accurate.
Meanwhile, only one interviewee contended that their intended audi-
ence for committee reports was the public—and a number of interviewees
expressly disclaimed this idea. As one interviewee put it: “Even though [the
committee report] is a public document, I assume that normal people will
never read it.”228 Another added: “You know the typical person is not going
to read this.”229
Why do individuals within Congress view committee reports as poor
vehicles for communicating with constituents? First, because a committee
report is a written document. To the extent that the public now receives
messages directly from Congress, interviewees explained, it does so prima-
rily through internet video clips or through television.230 In order for a state-
ment by a Member of Congress to reach the public via these vehicles, it must
be publicly uttered. Describing the significance, in particular, of the ability
of television cameras to capture spoken statements, one interviewee said:
“[W]ords you say can eventually be brought before a mass audience [in a
modern video era, whether] you plan to have it happen or not. Particularly in
the context of a political campaign.”231
By contrast, written documents are uniquely poor vehicles for reaching
the public. As one interviewee put it: “Something that’s just on paper, unless
you get [the facts] wrong—it’s a statement of policy, it’s not going to be
something that can really hang you [politically]. Because it doesn’t really go
before a broad audience.”232 Naturally, this changes the sense of audience
that staffers will have in mind when drafting these reports. In the words of
one staffer: “The paper reports are much more legal in nature, whereas the
Members’ statements, it’s more an emotional point, a political point that
you’re trying to make.”233 Consequently, the fact that committee reports are
226 Interview with No. 4, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
227 Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
228 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
229 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 25,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“You wouldn’t just pick up a committee report and read it
casually.”).
230 On the ways that communications departments utilize television and social media, see
supra Part III.C.2.
231 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
232 Id.
233 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 25,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“It’s definitely very different [if it is written].”).
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written reports has, in a unique way, insulated them from certain public-
oriented persuasion tactics.
Incidentally, this idea—namely, that written documents are uniquely
poor vehicles for communicating with the public—points toward an impor-
tant change that has occurred since the Founding. Article I, Section 5 of the
Constitution required that proceedings of the chambers of Congress be re-
corded in a written journal—and, according to conventional wisdom, it re-
quired this because written documentation was thought to be the best
technology available for the dissemination of information to the public.234
Today, by contrast, written documentation may be useful for precisely the
opposite reason: because it is a uniquely poor method of communicating
with this public, it liberates congressional actors to speak directly and pre-
cisely to legal implementers.
Interviewees also reported a second reason why committee reports are
poor vehicles for reaching the public: namely, because authorship of the re-
ports is attributed to the committee itself (or, at least, to a subset of the
committee). This institutional authorship undermines the possibility that the
report might be used to promote a specific Member. In the words of one
interviewee: “Some language in the report doesn’t have anybody’s name af-
ter it,” and this will make it difficult for any individual Member who wants
to use the report “to claim credit for something.”235 Moreover, it also makes
“off-message” statements far less damaging for specific Members. As the
same interviewee put it: “Having that space [to speak in a written text with-
out personal attribution] frees up the Members. They aren’t prancing for the
cameras. They aren’t worried about what some reporter’s going to say or if a
potential primary opponent is going to use one of their statements.”236
For several reasons, therefore, committee reports are viewed as an inef-
fective means of reaching the general public—and, consequently, the reports
are not targeted at this audience.
The constellation of intended audiences for committee reports helps ex-
plain their drafting assignment, which typically is given to committee legis-
lative staffers. As Part III.A explained, committee legislative staffers are
focused primarily upon the goal of achieving policy objectives, not of assist-
ing with reelection. Consequently, it makes sense to assign to these staffers
drafting responsibility for a statement that, on the one hand, is thought to be
essential to the development of a legislative record. As one interviewee put
it: “For committee reports . . . in terms of who took first draft, I think [the
assignment to committee legislative staff occurred] because they were look-
ing at it from a more legal eye, in terms of building the official legislative
record.”237 Meanwhile, it makes further sense to assign this report to com-
234
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see also Chafetz, supra note 22, at 742.
235 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
236 Id.
237 Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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mittee legislative staff when the report is assumed to escape media and pub-
lic attention. As the same interviewee put it: “[Communications staff is not
involved] because committee reports are never reported on in the press. . . .
They’re much more for the implementers.”238







Hearing & Markup Statements: Intended Audience
Courts & Agencies History & Future Congresses Constituents & Public
Too Varied to PredictCongressional Colleagues Interest Groups
Figure 14. Intended Audiences for Hearing & Markup Statements.
As Figure 14 shows, interviewees gave varied responses when describ-
ing the intended audiences for hearing and markup statements. As one inter-
viewee put it: “That’s a little bit more hybrid.”239 Specifically, a significant
number of interviewees identified four different audiences that they target
with hearing and markup statements: implementers, constituents, congres-
sional colleagues, and interest groups.
Of these, the greatest number of respondents identified the intended
audience of constituents (or, alternately, of the general public). Twenty inter-
viewees mentioned this audience. As one interviewee put it:
I would say generally we write those [statements] with someone
back home [in mind], intending for it to get eventually back to our
constituents. And generally . . . we will send it to stakeholders at
home and say, “[h]ey, wanted to make sure you saw the [Mem-
ber] spoke on this, the [Member] submitted a statement for this,
here’s how [he or she] thinks about it.” Sometimes, especially if
it’s a big vote on something that’s controversial, we’ll put the state-
ment on our website or turn it into talking points for our phones,
238 Id.
239 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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just so that, if constituents are calling in, we have something that
we can say, “[t]he boss feels this way about it, and here’s what
[he or she] said.” And that’s on our website. So, we do try to
make those things pretty accessible, since we do push them out—
typically back home.240
Another interviewee added:
For a Member statement at a hearing, or a Member statement at a
markup, or a Member statement on the floor, you’re very aware:
This is public. And it could be on C-SPAN. So, . . . I would say
there’s a strong element of, “I want the American people, whoever
may be watching, to know what this is about, and I want them on
my side.” So, there’s always—you’re trying to be persuasive for
whoever may be watching.241
Yet another added: “It’s [usually drafted around the idea that] ‘Member X
needs to say Y, so they can then go brag about it at home.’” 242
Meanwhile, thirteen interviewees said that these statements are in-
tended, at least in part, for congressional colleagues. According to these in-
terviewees, Members making these statements often are “using it as a time
to engage [opposite party] Members, because I do think [opposite party]
Members are more likely to hear what they’re saying,”243 and are “trying to
use the Member statement to either appeal to the other side, or make the
other side feel guilty.”244
Twelve interviewees also asserted that these statements are intended for
interest groups. As interviewees put it:
• “It’s also how they communicate with folks downtown, various
constituency groups.”245
• “I think I focus more on industry, because they’re very in tune
to when we have committee markups and hearings. I try to
make sure that we have always sent the right messages to the
right people in industry at our committee markup.”246
• “I would say probably [hearing statements are targeting] the
community that we’re legislating. It’s more of a warning—‘this
is coming.’” 247
240 Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
241 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
242 Interview with No. 28, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
243 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
244 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
245 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
246 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
247 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 8,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“There are organizations that follow every vote on particular
topics, and so we might do markup things to signal something to those groups—or [in] oppo-
sition to those groups.”); Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“It differs
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Nine interviewees, meanwhile, said that these statements are intended
for legal implementers. This category, again, includes both executive agen-
cies and courts. For hearing and markup statements, however, those who
specified the actor within the legal audience tended to point particularly to
agencies. For example, interviewees remarked that:
• “You are then using [those statements] as the basis for agen-
cies—because you’re saying, ‘I disagreed with this all the way
along.’ If a Member at a markup is really railing against some-
thing, you can guarantee they are going to write you a letter if
you’re in the administration, and be calling you, if it actually
passes.”248
• “A lot of times you know that, if something is controversial,
you know that you’ve got to make [certain] points [at the
markup] or the agencies are going to dismiss it.”249
Hearing and markup statements therefore target a hybrid audience that
consists of constituents, congressional colleagues, interest groups, and legal
implementers. Interviewees repeatedly described the drafting assignments
for these statements as resulting from their attempts to address—and priori-
tize among—these audiences. As one interviewee said: “[A Member office
will] have a different process for statements in hearings versus statements
on the floor. And that’s a function of, mostly, what the audience is.”250 To
this end, the interviewee also added:
I would be very surprised if there wasn’t a lot of interplay between
“comms” and “leg” on putting together remarks everywhere—
because . . . even if you’re in an arcane hearing about some arcane
topic, words you say can eventually be brought before a mass au-
dience—whether you plan to have that happen or not. Particularly
in the context of a political campaign. . . . So, ultimately, the com-
munications department is going to have to deal with the fallout of
that.251
Interviewees described a push-and-pull that regularly occurs in the
drafting of hearing and markup statements, whereby committee legislative
staff argue with Member legislative staff for a greater focus on the audience
of legal implementers, versus constituents—and whereby Member legisla-
tive staff, in turn, have the same arguments with Member communications
[from] Member to Member. I think there’s Members who will do it for constituents, there’s
Members who will do it for industry.”).
248 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
249 Interview with No. 21, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; see also Interview with No. 10,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
250 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
251 Id.
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staff.252 This is not surprising. It is the result of each staff position perform-
ing the job for which it is employed—and the resulting disputes are a natural
result of the attempt to generate a statement that simultaneously accom-
plishes different goals with multiple audiences.
While interviewees offered the foregoing observations about hearing
and markup statements generally, they also pointed to a few notable ways in
which some markup and hearing statements are distinct from others. First, a
number of interviewees mentioned that statements for the Chair or Ranking
Member on a committee, while still aimed at these multiple audiences, none-
theless will be somewhat more focused on the audience of legal implement-
ers.253 As one interviewee put it:
The opening statements and the remarks for the committee pro-
ceedings for the Chair[] and the Ranking Members [are] much
more technical in nature and less rhetoric, because that is an at-
tempt to assert congressional intent of what is being done. So, if
there ever is a question of how an executive agency is executing a
law, we can point back to that as congressional intent of what we
intended for it to do. . . . [A talking point for a down-dais Mem-
bers is] more about . . . rhetoric than it is correcting the intent.254
The interviewee added: “If there’s an intent question [then] you’re always
going to see the Chairman make that correction from the chair.”255
A few interviewees also suggested that there might be some difference
in intended audience for hearings, as opposed to markups. In the words of
one interviewee: “What you say in a hearing is typically driven by your
local politics; what you say in a markup is typically driven by congressional
intent or it’s that bill’s impact on your local state.”256
252 Interview with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
253 On the relationship of audience to reliability, see infra Part VI.
254 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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Figure 15. Intended Audiences for Floor Statements.
Interviewees asserted that floor statements are intended, above all, for
constituents or the general public. Twenty-four interviewees identified this
group as the intended audience of floor statements. As one interviewee put
it: “Floor speeches are a chance to speak to constituencies.”257 This central
focus upon constituents distinguishes floor statements even from committee-
level statements. As one interviewee explained: “We view floor remarks as
being so much more public-facing than something that happens in a
hearing.”258
In practice, this means that floor statements are drafted not only with
constituents in mind, but also with a focus upon the various media outlets
that Members will use to communicate their remarks to a broader public. As
one interviewee put it: “The floor statement is the starting point for press
coverage.”259
The focus on media outlets includes efforts to reach, and to make use
of, several different types of media. First, it includes making portions of the
statement available to traditional media outlets—typically via press state-
ment or press release.260 Second, it includes the television audience on
257 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
258 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
259 Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
260 Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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C-SPAN.261 Third, it includes audiences reached via the Internet—whether
through a website, email, or social media.262
The significant extent to which floor statements now are tailored for
Internet media—and, in particular, for social media—warrants particular
comment. As one interviewee noted: “This is all about the quote you can put
out, this is all about the video you can clip and put out as a weekly mes-
sage.”263 Another said of floor speeches: “Those are for snippets on
Facebook and Twitter.”264
Social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram typically
host video clips that are extremely short. As a result, floor speeches increas-
ingly are drafted with an eye toward crafting short segments that can be
“clipped” and repackaged for these outlets.265 Similarly, speeches may be
reviewed to ensure that there is no snippet that, taken out of context and
presented in isolation on social media, sounds impolitic.266 While video clips
on YouTube may be longer than those on social media, the desire to make
videos accessible on this site further contributes to this snippet-oriented
drafting approach.267 As a result, the emphasis on addressing floor statements
to constituents—and the burgeoning sense that social media is an exceed-
ingly effective way to reach these audiences—seems to be changing the
structure and rhetoric of floor speeches. As one interviewee put it:
The rise of digital [media] has forced a lot of people to think in
terms of 140 characters—or, now [with the change of Twitter
rules], 280 characters. To think in terms of what’s going to be In-
stagrammable. There are teams of people responsible for ensuring
that this content from the [Member] gets out.268
Whether through social media or more traditional outlets, however,
Members perceive floor speeches as presenting a unique opportunity to
reach constituents. As one interviewee summarized it:
261 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 20, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 22, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
262 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with
No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 16, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 20,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 23, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview
with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
263 Interview with No. 14, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 29, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
264 Interview with No. 15, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
265 Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
266 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
267 Interview with No. 13, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
268 Interview with No. 29, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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It’s not that the public at large is watching every moment of every
day what happens on the [chamber] floor. But there’s a certain
gravity that speaking on the [chamber] floor carries with it. And
things that transpire down there can break through . . . to the na-
tional consciousness into average people’s daily lives. . . . [You
can] change the course of our national conversation by speaking
on the [chamber] floor.269
Few interviewees mentioned other audiences for floor statements. The
only alternate audience members were that mentioned with any regularity
were congressional colleagues, who were identified as possible audience
members by ten interviewees.
Interviewees did note caveats to this, however. In particular, they iden-
tified three instances in which floor statements are intended more regularly
for legal implementers. First, they noted that colloquies regularly are
scripted in the effort to shape legal implementation.270 Second, they noted
that written remarks that are inserted into the record, rather than spoken on
the chamber floor, typically are intended for implementers rather than con-
stituents.271 Third, they reiterated that floor statements by a Chair or Ranking
Member on the committee of jurisdiction will be more directed toward legal
implementers.272
Once again, the intended audience for these statements helps explain
their drafting assignment. In particular, the central focus on reaching an au-
dience of constituents explains their assignment to Member offices gener-
ally, and the enhanced drafting role of Member communications staff
specifically. This linkage—between audience and drafting assignment—was
asserted time and again.273
269 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
270 Interview with No. 10, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 21, Cong.
Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
271 Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
272 Interview with No. 3, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
273 See, e.g., Interview with No. 5, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“External-facing com-
munications [are] where the communications team tends to come in, usually led by a commu-
nications director of some sort.”); Interview with No. 8, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“The
floor speeches were more forward-facing, and so ‘comms’ would get an eye to it.”); Interview
with No. 9, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (“The press team will be involved, because you’re
trying to make a point that you could send out to the press afterwards.”); see also Interview
with No. 1, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 2, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.;
Interview with No. 6, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 7, Cong. Staffer, in
Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 17, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 24,
Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.; Interview with No. 26, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. New Hierarchy of Legislative History Materials
The information reported in the foregoing pages has significant impli-
cations for an ongoing debate in the field of legislation: namely, the debate
over which types of legislative history courts should trust and prioritize.
Since courts want to use legislative documents that are reliable, the key
question in this debate has been a question of the comparative reliability of
different types of legislative history. Are some types of legislative history,
this debate has asked, consistently more reliable than others? If so, which
types?
According to the traditional view, some types indeed are more relia-
ble—and the comparative reliability of these different legislative history
materials is captured in an oft-repeated hierarchy. Under this hierarchy, leg-
islative materials are presented, in order of decreasing reliability, as follows:
(1) Committee reports;
(2) Statements by introducing Members and floor sponsors;
(3) All other Member statements.274
This hierarchy has not gone unchallenged; some scholars have posited
alternative hierarchies of legislative materials,275 while others have rejected
entirely the idea that legislative materials can be hierarchically arranged
based on their differing reliability.276 Nonetheless, this hierarchy continues to
be cited as the prevailing view on the comparative reliability of different
types of legislative history.277
The study of Congress offered in the foregoing pages, however, points
toward a different hierarchy of legislative history materials. This new hierar-
chy is grounded upon a commonsense intuition: namely, that the reliability
of a communication regularly turns on the institutional actor who generated
it.
The modern Congress, the foregoing study shows, is staffed by a range
of individuals who have very different job descriptions. These job descrip-
tions provide good reason to think, as a default assumption, that some actors
will generate more reliable documents than will others. After all, these actors
vary in terms of both their ability and their desire to report accurately. With
respect to ability, this is true for two reasons. First, congressional actors
differ in their background knowledge of a given policy area. This back-
274 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 981–1021. R
275 See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 120–24. R
276 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 5, at 134; see also Vermeule, supra note 15, at 1879–80 R
(noting that intentionalists often feel obligated to move from the hierarchy to more contextual,
case-by-case assessments of reliability).
277 See, e.g., CALEB E. NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 362–63 (2011); Nourse,
supra note 5, at 108; Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 120–21. R
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ground knowledge is relevant to ability to report accurately because, when
possessed, it permits specialists to articulate policy nuances and distinctions
that elude generalists. This dimension of staffer knowledge was captured in
Part III by staff differences with respect to: (1) specialization; and (2) policy
expertise. Second, as Part III explained, congressional actors also vary in
their knowledge of individual bills—a type of knowledge that is relevant to
ability to report accurately, since an individual cannot accurately report the
contents of a bill without first learning about those contents.
Moreover, congressional staffers also differ with respect to their desire
to communicate precisely and accurately. This dimension of staffer differ-
ences was captured in Part III by interviewee reports of their varying goals
with respect to different audiences. On the one hand, some staffers described
their intended audience as consisting primarily of legal implementers. With
respect to this audience, they asserted, their goal was precise and accurate
communication. On the other hand, some staffers described their intended
audience as composed primarily of constituents. With respect to this audi-
ence, they said, they had a diminished desire to be accurate—a quality re-
flected in their ambition to remove details and nuances, as well as in their
willingness to add “spin” and puffery.
It makes sense to prioritize statements and documents, therefore, when
they are drafted by an actor that is superior to his or her peers with respect to
each of: (1) specialization; (2) policy expertise; (3) knowledge of individual
bills; and (4) intent to address an audience with accuracy and precision.
When all four of these factors buttress one another, there is good reason to
think that an institutional actor is superior with respect to both ability and
desire to communicate accurately. In such situations, the resulting state-
ments or documents can properly be viewed, as a default, as more reliable.
Conveniently, these four factors do indeed buttress each other with re-
spect to different congressional staffers. They align to suggest that state-
ments will be most reliable when drafted by committee legislative staff
(which interviewees ranked highest on each of these dimensions), less relia-
ble when drafted by Member legislative staff (which interviewees ranked
lower on each dimension), and even less reliable when drafted by Member
communications staff (which staffers ranked lowest on all these reliability-
related dimensions).
When combined with the information from Part IV about staffer draft-
ing assignments, this hierarchy of staffer reliability translates into something
more useful for courts and scholars: namely, a hierarchy of legislative mater-
ials. Under this hierarchy, legislative materials are viewed, in order of de-
creasing reliability, as follows:
(1) Committee reports;
(2) All statements by committee Chairs and Ranking Members on
committees or subcommittees of jurisdiction;
(3) Other markup and hearing statements;
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(4) Other floor statements.
Interpreters, therefore, should consider adopting this new hierarchy
when interpreting legislative materials emerging from the modern Congress.
It is a hierarchy that, in some cases, challenges prevailing wisdom. This is
seen, for example, in its contention that, to the extent that a single Member’s
statements should be prioritized as especially reliable, that Member should
be the committee Chair or Ranking Member, not the introducing Member or
floor sponsor. It also challenges the existing hierarchy with its contention
that hearing and markup statements are more reliable than floor statements.
In other cases, the new hierarchy confirms prevailing wisdom—but, to
accomplish this, it places that wisdom on new foundations. This is seen, for
example, in its confirmation that committee reports are particularly reliable.
This is the case, the foregoing study observes, not because committee reports
are drafted by Members who personally developed the bill in committee, and
who therefore have a heightened exposure to the bill and its underlying de-
bates. Instead, it discovers, these reports are especially reliable because,
among other things, they: (1) are drafted solely by committee legislative
staffers; and (2) are written documents attributed to institutional authors, and
thereby are not suited to television or social media.
Additionally, the foregoing pages noted some specific instances in
which particular statements or documents will be of heightened reliability,
relative to comparable statements of the same type. Statutory interpreters
may also want to consider giving these particular forms of legislative history
heightened priority. These might include: (1) colloquies; (2) remarks in-
serted into the record; or (3) certain statements from the Senate, as opposed
to the House.278
As with the currently-used hierarchy, it should be noted, this new hier-
archy of legislative materials should be viewed as the starting point—not the
end point—of any examination of legislative history. These hierarchies al-
ways remain subject to rebuttal by evidence that, in a specific instance,
unique legislative circumstances led a particular document to be more (or
less) reliable than usual. These hierarchies simply provide interpreters with a
default assumption about reliability, in other words, and the new hierarchy
proposed in this Article is no different. With this new hierarchy, however,
interpreters can ensure that the default assumption is anchored in the realities
of the modern Congress.
278 This heightened reliability of colloquies reinforces a finding by Gluck and Bressman.
See Congressional Drafting Part I, supra note 5, at 986. R
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B. Textualist Prohibitions on Legislative History
1. Accuracy Reviews of Committee Reports
Rather than advocating for any hierarchy of legislative history materi-
als, textualists have argued that courts simply should not utilize legislative
history. In support of this argument, textualists have advanced a number of
arguments—including one that, in the effort to show that committee reports
are unreliable, relies on an observation about the drafting process for these
reports. These textualists have drawn attention to the fact that Members of
Congress, in many instances, neither read nor write legislative history.279 By
highlighting the fact that Members are not reading or writing this history,
textualists have conjured an image of the drafting staffers as troublingly un-
moored from the will of Members—and they have suggested, consequently,
that documents generated by these staffers are not sufficiently reliable to
warrant their use by courts.280 In this way, textualists have offered an argu-
ment that relies on an important assumption: namely, that direct authorship
by Members, or direct review by the Members, is the key oversight mecha-
nism in Congress.
In their response to this argument, intentionalists largely have accepted
the premise advanced by textualists—and they have advanced an institu-
tional premise of their own. Members of Congress, these intentionalists ob-
serve, similarly do not read or write statutory text.281 The implication,
presumably, is that the textualist observation fails to provide a cogent reason
for distinguishing between statutes and legislative history. By focusing ex-
clusively upon this rebuttal, however, intentionalists have failed to provide
any affirmative reason to believe that committee reports are reliable. Moreo-
ver, by adopting the textualist focus upon Member review of documents
(and broadening it to other legislative materials beyond committee reports),
279 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 32–35 (1997). See also Hirschey
v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that deference to
committee reports created a system of “committee-staff prescription” and quoting an ex-
change in which Senators confessed they had neither written nor fully read a committee re-
port). For others making this argument, see, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative
Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420–21 (2005); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observa-
tion, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 384–85; Ray Stringham, Crystal Gazing: Legislative History in
Action, 47 A.B.A. J. 466, 467 (1961); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, USING
AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 53–56 (summarizing this argument and noting the vari-
ous scholars who have advanced it) [hereinafter USING AND MISUSING].
280 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer to
know that [his or her citation of obscure district court cases in a committee report] . . . can
transform them into the law of the land . . . .”).
281 See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 56 (1999); Patricia M.
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 307 (1990).
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they have buttressed the textualist assumption that Member review is the
relevant oversight mechanism in Congress.
The interviews conducted for this Article, however, reveal broader
problems with this debate. According to these interviews, it is true that
Members might not provide direct oversight of the production of committee
reports.282 This does not mean, however, that no effective mechanisms exist
to ensure that staffers generate accurate legislative history. In fact, inter-
viewees explained, other accountability mechanisms have moved to the fore
in Congress. Most notably, interviewees emphasized that opposing-party re-
view provides an important institutional check with respect to committee
reports.283 According to interviewees, the routine practice on many commit-
tees is to share the fully drafted committee report with the committee staffers
of the opposing party—and to do so prior to filing or publishing this legisla-
tive history. This affords the minority an opportunity either to: (1) flag any
inaccuracies in the report and insist upon their correction; or (2) in the case
that the majority is unwilling to address the inaccuracies, file separate mi-
nority views. In the case that minority views are filed, moreover, the same
process might occur in reverse; the majority is given the opportunity to re-
view the report in advance of filing or publication, thereby allowing Mem-
bers the chance to file additional views that rebut any inaccuracies
discovered in the minority views. In fact, as Part IV explained, a number of
committees have entrenched this practice by writing it into their committee
rules.
When viewed in light of this congressional practice, it becomes evident
that this entire debate between textualists and intentionalists is misguided.
Both sides of this debate have accepted the premise that Member review is
the primary mechanism to guard against nefarious staffers inserting mislead-
ing statements—an assumption which wholly misses the fact that Congress
has developed an alternative mechanism to accomplish this task. In light of
this practice, courts should operate under the default assumption that, in situ-
ations where interviewees suggested that opposing party review is uniform
practice, committee reports have undergone a review for accuracy. These
situations include: (1) any situation in which minority views are not filed;
(2) situations in which minority views are filed, but the underlying bill was
not politically contentious; and (3) situations in which reports are issued by
committees that, in their committee rules, require opposing-party review.
Meanwhile, more investigation should be done into the extent to which com-
mittees perform opposing-party review even beyond this defined set of situa-
tions—because, even in these instances, a number of interviewees suggested
that opposing-party review does still occur.
282 See supra Part IV.E.
283 See supra notes 177–179 and accompanying text. R
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2. Audiences and Motivations
Textualists also advance a second argument challenged by the foregoing
study. According to these textualists, legislative history often contains strate-
gic, calculated attempts to manipulate the courts.284 To support this argu-
ment, Justice Scalia provides a purported history of the shifting incentives
that have weighed upon Congress. At one time, he argues, legislative history
was drafted in order “to inform and persuade those who voted.”285 In such
instances, Scalia suggests, the overriding congressional incentive was to pro-
duce an accurate statement that would reliably inform internal institutional
actors (viz., Members of Congress) about the contents of a bill. However, as
courts increasingly came to use legislative history to interpret statutes, Scalia
says, a powerful new incentive weighed upon Congress: namely, the incen-
tive to use legislative history as a tool to manipulate courts. As Judge Kozin-
ski puts it when making this same argument, the idea is that: “The
propensity of judges to look past the statutory language . . . creates strong
incentives for manipulating legislative history.”286 This incentive, Scalia
adds, took over as the dominant incentive in Congress. Consequently, he
concludes that: “[A]ffecting the courts rather than informing the Congress
has become the primary purpose of the exercise.”287 The result, he suggests,
is that the dominant incentive ceased to be incentive to communicate reliable
information to actors within Congress—and, instead, it became incentive to
communicate unreliable information to actors outside Congress.
The foregoing study complicates these claims in several ways. First, it
adds complexity to the relatively simplistic narrative Scalia offers about the
historical evolution of the audience for legislative history. Contrary to
Scalia’s suggestion on this front—namely, that Congress now adopts a sin-
gle-minded focus on courts as the intended audience—this study shows that
the modern Congress addresses a variety of audiences through its legislative
history: legal implementers, constituents, congressional colleagues, future
congresses, and interest groups, among others. Moreover, even when Con-
284
SCALIA, supra note 279, at 34. See also Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that materials are inserted into legislative history “to influence judicial construc-
tion”); Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7–8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that “routine deference to
the detail of committee reports” by courts had led to “the predictable expansion in that detail”
by a Congress eager to take advantage of the courts’ use of those reports). For others making
this argument, see, for example, Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The propensity of judges to look past
the statutory language is well known to legislators. It creates strong incentives for manipulat-
ing legislative history to achieve through the courts results not achievable during the enact-
ment process.”); Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1019 (1992); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra
note 279, at 53–55 (summarizing this argument and noting the various scholars who have
advanced it).
285
SCALIA, supra note 279, at 34.
286 Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1559 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment).
287
SCALIA, supra note 279, at 34.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\hll102.txt unknown Seq: 67  6-JAN-20 14:57
2020] Legislative History in the Modern Congress 157
gress is targeting legal implementers, the study shows, its Members fre-
quently are thinking primarily of agencies, not courts. The textualist
narrative about audience, therefore, suffers from a first infirmity: it oversim-
plifies the intended audience for legislative history. In so doing, it overlooks
the fact that different types of legislative history target different audiences.
Second, this study also challenges the textualist assumptions about the
goals that congressional drafters pursue with different audiences. According
to the textualist argument, these drafters pursue the goal of accurate descrip-
tion when addressing congressional colleagues, but they pursue a goal of
misleading persuasion when addressing courts. By contrast, interviewees for
this study contended that they pursue the goal of accurate description when
addressing either of these audiences—but that they drift toward simplistic
overviews, as well as puffery and persuasion, when addressing constituents.
As previously noted, there is good reason to bring some skepticism to
interviewee self-reporting on this front. The nefarious motives suggested by
Scalia and Kozinski could only succeed, after all, if congressional staffers
persisted in the pretense that they were trying to provide courts with an accu-
rate description of their labors. In this regard, the study offered in the forego-
ing pages is wholly consistent with the textualist account. Yet interviewees
revealed a surprising willingness to confess that, with respect to constituents,
their goals were more complex—despite the fact that their communications
to constituents, it would seem, rely no less on a perception of accuracy. This
candor among interviewees provides some reason to take seriously the idea
that the textualist account misapprehends the goals that congressional staff-
ers pursue when they seek to address courts. As such, it also throws into
question the textualist assumption that congressional statements aimed at
courts should be treated, for that reason, as unreliable.
C. Legislative Record Review
The foregoing study also has implications for a particular form of con-
stitutional review that has emerged recently. Over the past two decades, the
Supreme Court has begun to make stringent demands of the legislative re-
cord in its reviews of the constitutionality of federal legislation. Beginning
perhaps with Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett288 in
2001, the Court has started to insist that, in order for federal legislation to
pass constitutional scrutiny, the constitutionally appropriate logic supporting
the legislation must be apparent from, and explicit in, the legislative record
for that legislation.289 Under this form of review, rational motives will not be
attributed to Congress; rather, those motives must be explicitly documented
288 531 U.S. 356 (2001). On Garrett as the emergence of this trend, as well as on the
predecessor cases that set the stage for Garrett, see William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro,
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 136–43, 160–61 (2001).
289 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\57-1\hll102.txt unknown Seq: 68  6-JAN-20 14:57
158 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 57
by Congress in its legislative history. A version of this judicial review—
which Buzbee and Schapiro have labeled as “legislative record review”290—
made a particularly noteworthy appearance in Shelby County v. Holder,291
the case from 2013 that overturned a key provision in the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.292
Implicit in this “legislative record review” is an assumption about the
comprehensiveness of the legislative record. After all, the relevant constitu-
tional tests are designed to assess whether necessary factual predicates ex-
isted to logically and legally warrant the legislative intervention, and perhaps
to assess whether those predicates did indeed trigger the intervention. Ac-
cording to the Court’s logic, if the legislative record does not document a
congressional cognizance of certain facts and concerns, then those facts and
concerns did not animate the enacting Congress. This logic makes sense only
if one assumes that the legislative record by Congress is a comprehensive
documentation of the considerations that spurred the enactment of the
legislation.
As several scholars have noted, insofar as “legislative record review”
assumes the legislative record to be comprehensive, it rests upon a naı̈ve
and flawed assumption about the legislative process.293 A great deal of con-
gressional fact-gathering, informational assessment, and policy development
occurs in off-the-record settings. As Bryant and Simeone put it: “Congress
properly relies on a wide range of information-gathering methods not re-
flected in the formal legislative record.”294
The present study both updates and reinforces this observation from
Bryant and Simeone. It does so, in particular, by revealing the extent to
which staffers now view many on-the-record moments essentially as media
opportunities, not as chances to compile and assess legislative facts and ar-
guments. As Part IV.E observed, these on-the-record moments are now regu-
larly scripted and viewed in Congress as “Kabuki theatre” performed for
constituents and the media, as one interviewee put it.295 Indeed, interviewees
described how even witness testimonies at hearings—which have a height-
ened appearance of a real-time gathering of facts—are often scripted.296 Ac-
cording to these descriptions, official congressional fora are not operating as
genuine spaces of legislative fact-finding and deliberation. As such, it
290 Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 288.
291 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
292 See id.
293 See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 288, at 160–61; A. Christopher Bryant &
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record”
Constitutional Review of Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 369–70 (2001); Harold J. Krent,
Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 731, 739 (1996); Margaret B. Kwoka, Setting Congress Up to Fail, 17 BERKE-
LEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 97, 102 (2015).
294 Bryant & Simeone, supra note 293, at 385.
295 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
296 Interview with No. 19, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
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stretches credulity to treat the record compiled in these spaces as a compre-
hensive documentation of the earnest fact-finding efforts of Congress. Yet
this is precisely what courts do when they conduct “legislative record re-
view.” As such, the foregoing study provides a potent reason why this form
of review should be abandoned.
D. Rhetorical Duplicity in Congress
Interviews for this Article revealed that, when addressing the public,
Members of Congress sometimes intentionally speak with diminished accu-
racy. While interviewees never described these public-oriented communica-
tions as outright prevarications, their comments nonetheless raise a difficult
question: what should statutory interpreters do when Congress attempts to
speak out both sides of its mouth? In other words, what is the proper role for
courts to play when Congress—through legislative history—tries to instruct
implementers that a statute contains one idea, and then also tries to persuade
the public that the statute contains another idea? This Article operates out of
the supposition that, in this instance, the role of the court is simply to adhere
to the implementation-oriented intent of Congress. Yet it is certainly under-
standable that some might want courts to hold Members accountable for
their publicly-directed communications—including by binding interpretation
to these communications, even when it is clear that this transgresses con-
gressional intent. Such an approach would need to adopt a more robust vi-
sion for the courts in statutory interpretation than the “faithful agency”
model that most courts espouse, however—and it would need to overcome
recent evidence that efforts by courts to discipline Congress are largely inef-
fectual.297 Still, the findings by this study bring this challenging question to
the fore.
E. The Role of Communications Staffers
It does not appear that, prior to this Article, there has been any ac-
knowledgment or discussion in the legal literature of a particular type of
congressional staffer: the communications staffer.298 This silence is surpris-
ing. As interviews for this Article revealed, these staffers now play a central
role in shaping a dialogue that is central to our democratic system: namely,
the ongoing dialogue between Members of Congress and the public. Moreo-
ver, it is not immediately obvious that the impact that communications staff-
ers are having upon this dialogue is, from a constitutional standpoint, wholly
beneficial. As communications scholar Timothy Cook has noted: “The pres-
ence of a press secretary is important . . . because the position integrates
297 See generally Congressional Drafting Part II, supra note 5. R
298 See COOK, supra note 21, at 79.
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journalistic perspectives into the House office.”299 Is the rise of “journalistic
perspectives” inside congressional offices—and the concomitant rise of im-
pressionistic and spin-oriented tactics—beneficial or harmful to the constitu-
tionally-envisioned project of communicating Member efforts to the general
public?300 The answer to this seems far from certain. As such, while an ex-
ploration of these questions was beyond the scope of this Article, it should
be an important avenue of further study for legislation scholars.
F. Opposing Party Review of Committee Reports
Section IV.A discussed an interesting committee-level practice uncov-
ered by the interviews for this Article: partisan committee staff allows their
opposing party counterparts to review (and to negotiate for changes to) the
report. This practice brings with it a number of important benefits. For the
committees, interviewees explained, the practice helps ensure the accuracy
of the resulting committee reports, and it also helps promote bipartisanship
within Congress by fostering amicable working relationships with opposing
party staff.301 For statutory interpreters, meanwhile, this practice provides the
benefit cited in Part VI: it provides added assurance that committee reports
are not generated by an unchecked staffer who, in the absence of such insti-
tutional mechanisms of accountability, might seize the opportunity to insert
misleading information into the report.
To maximize these benefits, committees should consider expanding and
formalizing this practice. This might include three reforms. First, it could
include the extension of this practice to any situations in which it may not
currently be occurring in Congress. Reports were mixed on whether this
practice extended even to divisive bills for which minority views were sub-
mitted. It would make sense to extend this practice into—and perhaps espe-
cially into—these hyper-partisan situations.
Second, more committees could formalize this practice by requiring it
in their committee rules. Taking this extra step, even on committees that
already informally follow this practice, would have important benefits. First,
it would make it more difficult for committees to disregard this practice in
specific situations in which they might be tempted to do so. Second, it would
provide outside interpreters with a formal, written assurance that the report
had been subjected to this accuracy-enhancing review. In other words, it
could act as a certain type of warranty to the outside world—one that an-
nounces that any particular committee report was subject to this beneficial
review. This warranty already exists for some committees, where it simply is
being neglected by courts and scholars. Yet it would make sense for more
299 See id. at 71 (1989).
300 On the constitutional assumption of this Member-public dialogue, see supra note 22. R
301 See, e.g., Interview with No. 25, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C. (citing both of these
effects).
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committees to offer it, particularly if they already are undertaking this prac-
tice anyway, and especially if courts begin to acknowledge its utility to their
interpretive endeavor.
Third, committees may want to consider adding a timing component to
this practice. One interviewee raised concerns that, while committee reports
are shared with the opposing party prior to their publication, the time pro-
vided for review before publication may be so short that a detailed, in-depth
review becomes difficult.302 If committee rules specified the amount of time
that opposing party staff must be afforded with a report prior to its publica-
tion, this situation could be prevented, and the benefits of the opposing party
review process could be maximized.
Through these reforms, congressional committees not only could im-
prove their work product, but also could provide courts with valuable assur-
ance of the reliability of committee materials. In so doing, these committees
could build upon Congress’s own past successes in devising and implement-
ing internal mechanisms to promote accuracy and accountability—successes
that, to date, courts and scholars have entirely overlooked.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the last four decades, Congress has undergone a profound series
of changes. Transformed into a modern bureaucracy, it now bears little re-
semblance to the institution that existed a half century ago. For statutory
interpreters seeking to make sense of the legislative materials that emerge
from this modern Congress, a working understanding of the institution—its
actors, its rules, and its processes—can prove invaluable. Similarly, this in-
stitutional understanding is essential to legislative reform projects—since
these projects, in order to improve the institution, first must understand it.
By developing this institutional understanding of Congress as it applies to
legislative history, this Article hopefully has assisted in both these endeav-
ors—and, in so doing, has highlighted the valuable work that remains yet to
be done in the “process-based turn” in legislation scholarship.
302 Interview with No. 11, Cong. Staffer, in Wash., D.C.
